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The recent succession of warship collisions questioned the Navy capacity to 
ensure safe navigation. This situation inspired this exploratory study of warship, 
coast guard and commercial ship safety in operations. In this study, Systems 
thinking is applied in the context of maritime safety. This novel research 
emphasizes behaviour and purpose (finality). As the finality of a system is 
deduced from its behaviour, the research differentiates allocated finality and 
achieved finality. Indeed, safety first motto may in some cases be purely 
rhetorical. To discuss this view, focus groups were organised and to benchmark 
the findings, an interview with an Irradiated Nuclear Fuel ship expert was 
conducted. The first findings show that warship, coast guard ship and commercial 
ship operations cannot be strictly compared. Really, ownership and mission 
allocation are major determinants in ship design and operation, and therefore, pre-
determine safety. The institutional framework and culture of navy, coast guard 
and commercial shipping also affect ship safety practices. Due to the uniqueness 
of each system of maritime operation, ready-made safety solutions could be 
counter-productive if not properly adapted to the specificities and constraints of 
each system. Any systemic alteration has to embrace the inherent limits and 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
1.0 Background of the Study 
Maritime operations1 have always borne inherent risk of accidents. From the 
ancient era of wooden ships to steel ships of the present, preventing accidents has 
been a challenge in the operation of ships of all types and classification. 
Generically, safety is the characteristic or attribute of a system, necessary and 
sufficient to reduce the number of harmful events to crew, ships, organisations or 
environment to an acceptably low level (Hollnagel, 2014). Therefore, to 
effectively address safety, thinking should be organised in systems2 approach. 
Systems thinking “is a set of synergistic analytic skills used to improve the 
capability of identifying and understanding systems, predicting their behaviours, 
and devising modifications to them in order to produce desired effects” (Arnol & 
Wade, 2015). The ability to think in systems is itself a system which creates a 
behaviour pattern. The above definition and explanation of systems in glossary, 
show that to understand and improve a system to achieve its purpose, it is 
important to study its behaviour. Behaviour and purpose as key concepts are 
applied to understand safety of systems in this research. 
   
                                                        
1 Maritime Operations are activities and actions conducted with the aim of achieving the purposes of 
warships, CG ships and commercial ships. See Glossary for further description. 
2 See Glossary for explanations of systems. 
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The systems discussed in this research are Navy, Coast Guard (CG) and 
commercial shipping organisations. Particularly, the respective subsystems3 of 
these systems, which are warships, CG ships and commercial ships, will be 
analysed due to the apparent rise in accidents involving these ships.  
 
Since 2017, a worrying trend of warship accidents have occurred involving 
Argentina, Chile, China, Germany, Italy, Taiwan, Norway and United States (US) 
Navies (MAREX, 2017; Schkvarkin, 2018 Septemebr 26; Larter and Sprenger, 
2018; Strong, 2019; Voytenko, 2018; Voytenko, 2019a; Stickings, 2019; 
Voytenko, 2019b). Similarly, accidents have been recorded in CG ship operations 
(NTSB/MAB-17/22, 2016; NTSB/MAB-17/37, 2017). These accidents have 
raised concerns about warships, which are fitted with high-tech navigation 
equipment and are supposed to be constantly alert (Bakhsh, 2018). To understand 
this trend, there is a need for a closer look at maritime operations. 
 
Five warships of the United States Navy 7th Fleet based in the Pacific, United 
States Ship (USS) Antietam, USS Lake Chaplain, USS Fitzgerald, USS John 
McCain and USS Benfold were involved in accidents between 2017 and 2018 
(Navy Office of Information, 2017a; Navy Office of Information, 2017b, 
Bateman, 2018). On 15 November, 2017 Argentinean Navy lost the submarine 
San Juan, after its batteries caught fire (Rey, 2019). A German Navy Corvette, 
Erfurt rammed a jetty “Tirpitz mole” at Kiel on 21 September 2018, with the 
warship sustaining bow damages (Voytenko, 2018). On 8 November 2018, the 
Norwegian Navy Frigate Kongelige Norske Marine (KNM) Helge Ingstad 
collided with the Motor Tanker (MT) Sola TS and subsequently sank (AIBN, 
2018). USS Leyte Gulf and United States Navy Ship (USNS) Robert E. Peary 
collided on 5 February 2019 while conducting underway replenishment (LaGrone 
& Eckstein, 2019). A Saudi Arabian tanker Sama on 8 March, 2019 ran into a 
Taiwanese Frigate Ning Yang berthed in harbour, causing damage to the warship 
                                                        
3 See Glossary for description of subsystems. 
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(Strong, 2019). On 8 May 2019, the Italian Frigate Federico Martinengo collided 
with the Italian fishing vessel Sofia Fabio with both ships sustaining minor 
damages (Voytenko, 2019a). On 1 August 2019, a Chinese warship suspected to 
be the Lufang collided with a Taiwanese bulk carrier Youtai No. 1 (Stickings, 
2019). Recently on 29 August 2019, an explosion on Chilean warship Sargento 
Aldea during maintenance works led to crew injuries (Voytenko, 2019b). This 
alarming trend highlights the need to review warship operations in order to 
mitigate accidents. 
 
CG ships show a similar accident trend. Recent collisions between United States 
Coast Guard Cutter4 (USCGC) Thetis and towing vessel Matachin, and USCGC 
Tampa and Tugboat Cerro Santiago also raised concerns, since CG ships are to 
ensure safety of navigation (NTSB/MAB-17/22, 2016; NTSB/MAB-17/37, 
2017). Though safety measures were taken by the USCGC the accidents still 
occurred due to fatigue and improper lookout. 
 
There have been many commercial ship accidents resulting in the loss of property 
and damage to the environment (Butt, Johnson, Pike, Pryce-Roberts & Vigar, 
2012). Commercial ship accidents still occur such as the collision between the MV 
Ulysse and a ferry MV Virginia on 7 October 2018. On 12 March 2019, a fire 
broke out on MV Grande America which later sank. The Viking Sky was in 
distress when its engines failed while underway in bad weather on 23 March 2019 
(MAREX, 2019; Jeffery, 2019). These instances show that accidents prevail in 
commercial shipping and indicate the need for an in-depth study. 
 
Several individual, governmental and international efforts in addressing shipping 
accidents resulted from investigations of earlier accidents (Butt et al., 2012; JTSB, 
2018). Investigations into the sinking of the Royal Mail Steamer (RMS) Titanic 
                                                        
4 See Glossary for definition of Cutter. 
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and the consequent development of the International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS) by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) led to 
changes in maritime operations, making them safer (IMO, 1974; Cathey, 2017). 
SOLAS and other regulations such as International Regulation for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea (IRPCS) 1972, recommend measures for preventing collisions 
and accidents (IMO, 1972). However, there is a need to approach safety differently 
since shipping accidents are still prevalent. 
 
A systemic approach is a potent one. The casualty investigation into the 2011 
Deepwater Horizon disaster highlighted systemic failures in management of risk 
as underlying causes (National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill and Offshore Drilling [U.S.], 2011). Additionally, Leveson (2011) states that 
“Safety is clearly an emergent property of systems and safety can only be 
determined in the context of the whole”. The purpose of this work is to understand 
the links and reciprocal influences between systems (i.e. Navy, CG and Shipping 
Industry) and their dependent sub-system ships5.  
 
1.1 Problem Statement  
The annual increase in seaborne trade of about 4%, with a growing world 
commercial ship fleet of over 93,161 ships, continues to constrict the maritime 
space (UNCTAD, 2017). According to the Pennant List of IHS Jane’s Fighting 
ships 2015/2016 yearbook, there were about 7369 warships and patrol crafts 
across the world (Saunders, 2016). A similar list in the 2017/2018 edition of the 
same publication indicated 7513 warships and patrol crafts (Saunders, 2017). The 
number of warships and patrol crafts in the world has increased, which may be 
due to increases in fleet sizes of emerging naval powers (e.g. China) (Mizokami, 
2018a; Woody, 2018a; Military Factory, 2019). The occupancy of the maritime 
domain by increasing numbers of ships and the multiplication of offshore 
                                                        
5 See Glossary for Definition of Sub-system ship. 
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activities (e.g. wind-farms, oil and gas) has constricted the maritime space and 
raised the probability of accidents. 
  
Efforts to improve safety have focused on ship safety but have been oblivious to 
the larger context of maritime operations, despite some attempts such as that of 
the IMO in Shipping6 (ISM Code) (IMO, 2000). Warships, CG and Commercial 
ships operate within such operational and administrative systems. These ships 
could be seen as tools used to achieve the objectives (finality) of the systems. High 
level control of subsystem-warship relies on policies, instructions and crew 
performance to ensure goals are achieved. Crew performance is however 
influenced by the training of seafarers as stipulated by Standards of Training 
Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW, 1978 as amended) (IMO, 1978). In 
contrast, Navy and CG watchkeepers are largely trained and certified based on 
standards set by the specific Navy or CG authority. Non-maritime focused training 
such as staff officer qualification draws away from watchkeeping training (US 
Navy, 2017a). This may limit the experience of watchkeepers. 
 
Indeed, how warships or CG ships with relatively larger crew using high-tech 
navigation equipment and commercial ships operating under strict safety 
standards regulated by IMO can collide in open waters is difficult to comprehend. 
Therefore, the research problem is to assess the influence of systems on the safe 
operation of their respective subsystem-ships (warships, CG ships and commercial 
ships) using system thinking. Due to the highlighted trend in warship accidents, 





                                                        
6 See Glossary for definition of Shipping. 
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1.2 Dynamics of a Typical Maritime Operations Systems 
 
 
Figure 1: Modified diagram of system by Baumler (2019) to represent the 
dynamics of a Navy system. Source; Researcher. 
 
Navy as a system is a collection of parts/elements/subsystems (warships, naval 
bases, harbours, logistics bases, ship building yards) which are interrelated/ 
interconnected. A warship is an important subsystem (subsystem- warship7) of 
system-Navy8. Both are viewed as open-systems/subsystems. The interconnected 
                                                        
7 See Glossary for definition of subsystem-warship. 
8 See Glossary for definition of System-Navy. 
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parts/elements in a subsystem-warship (engines and machinery, navigational 
equipment, weapons and weapon systems, rudders and propellers, crew, command 
structure) interact with each other. These interactions create a coherent whole 
producing a characteristic set of behaviour (war characteristics) to achieve an 
objective/finality (Meadows, 2008).  
 
Elements with similar interactions (crew members of the same ship) fall into a 
subsystem while elements with dissimilar interactions (crew of a ship and an HQ 
administrative staff) fall in different subsystems (Pomeroy & Sherwood, 2006; 
Baumler, 2019). Subsystem-warships have a hard boundary since their boundaries 
are the hull of a ship. Subsystem-warships are highly influenced by HQ (systems 
control) inputs/decisions (policies, resources, instructions). They are also 
influenced by the wider environment (economic challenges, political system, and 
security situation) in which they are situated. These inputs and influences enable 
warships to achieve objectives (finality) and also build a stock9. Ineffective 
subsystem-warship administration or operation could lead to accidents. Further 
subsystem-warship discussions are in Chapter Four. 
 
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to explore Navy, CG and Commercial shipping 
operations with systems thinking to find trends and suggest ways to improve ship 
safety, particularly in relation to warship operations. This research seeks to attain 
the following objectives: 
 To analyse the conduct of maritime operations in sub-systems (warship, 
CG and commercial ship) using the concepts of behaviour and finality. 
 To analyse recommendations in recent warship, CG and shipping 
accident investigation reports to draw lessons which can be implemented 
in the 3 categories of maritime operations. 
                                                        
9 See Glossary for definition of stock. 
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 To examine systems- (Navy, CG and Shipping) and identify the effect of 
their respective context (economic, political, technical and ideological) 
on safety of ship. 
 To suggests ways to improve the safety of warship, CG and commercial 
ship operations. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
The research mainly seeks to investigate how system thinking could unveil the 
phenomenon of emergence and dynamics of safety in warship, CG and 
commercial ship operations. The work seeks to confirm whether the current 
conduct of maritime operations leads to the attainment of the allocated purpose 
(finality) of subsystems-ship. The following sub-questions serve as guide in 
answering the main research question: 
 How the finality of warship, CG and commercial ships influences ship 
design and operation? 
 Which institutional framework/culture predisposes ships to accidents? 
 What are the strengths and weaknesses in warships, CG and commercial 
ships operations when considered as sub-systems? 
 
1.5 Research Methods 
To answer these questions, suitable research methods were selected. The research 
adopted qualitative methods of phenomenology, since it provides a means of in-
depth exploration into the experiences and views of individuals (experts) (Yuksel 
& Yildirim, 2015). The individuals were selected based on their experience and 
according to purposive sampling (Cresswell & Clark, 2011). Such in-depth study 
of warship, CG and commercial ship safety in operations could reveal causes of 
recent trend of accidents and enhance its avoidance. Qualitative methods which 
seek to analyse phenomena and reveal details were preferentially selected instead 




1.5.1 Data Collection 
Data was collected from primary and secondary sources. Phenomenological data 
collections methods of focus groups and interviews were selected based on 
effectiveness in answering the research question (Palmer, Larkin, Visser & Faden, 
2010). As stated by O'Dwyer & Bernauer (2013), validity, reliability and meaning 
were achieved through in-depth data collection, interpretation and thorough data 
analysis. 
 Primary Data. The focus group used semi-structured questions. This gave 
the participants (mostly maritime professionals) the leverage to contribute 
and discuss the details of each subject to reveal insights. It also allowed 
discussions to lead to emergent topics. Focus Groups enabled in-depth 
exploratory study of the dynamics of safety in Navy, CG and Commercial 
shipping industry. A semi-structured interview was conducted with an 
expert in a mode of shipping with high safety standards (zero-accident 
record). This served as a reference point for analysis and comparison of 
safety of warship, CG and commercial ship operations.  
 Secondary Data. Literature on application of systems theory; behaviour 
and purpose were reviewed. Finality and purposeful behaviour are 
highlighted in the literature review. These concepts are considered in 
Gestalt States, which means concepts in their whole functioning states 
(Koffka, 1935). Gestalts are used in classifying the properties of systems. 
Therefore, Gestalts of counterfinality and purposeful behaviour are subtly 
used to classify qualities of systems (Navy, CG and shipping) (Florio, 
2015; Sevaldson, 2017). The research investigates whether the conduct of 
maritime operations (behaviour) seeks to attain the purpose (finality) of 
the subsystem-ship. This was achieved through an analysis of the 
organization and structure of subsystem-ship. The International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and IMO regulations were also reviewed to find useful 
concepts on ship and crew safety standards. Some regulations reviewed 
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were SOLAS, STCW and Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) 2006 
(ILO, 2006). 
 
1.5.2 Data Analysis 
Participants were carefully selected to ensure useful contributions of ideas to this 
research. The model of a high safety mode of shipping revealed the 
interconnections and interactions of components in a comprehensive view. Data 
was analysed to see if the goal of ships were achieved by their operation. This was 
in line with Meadows’ (2008) view that “purposes are deduced from behaviour, 
not from rhetoric or stated goals.” Additionally, Leveson’s (2011) matrix of four 
control conditions was used in analysing ownership and mission of subsystem-
ships. 
 
1.5.3 Systemic Solutions 
Systemic suggestions on ways of influencing change in safety, particularly for 
warships, followed a 12 Factor approach proposed by Meadows (2008). The 12-
factors are leverage points in systems where a small influence could yield a large 
change in behaviour. 
 
1.6 Organisation of Research 
The research is structured in five Chapters with five Appendices.  
 Chapter One gives an introduction to the whole topic highlighting the 
problem statement, research aim and objectives and proposed research 
methods.  
 Chapter Two gives a literature review and sets the theoretical basis for the 
work. Systems concepts of finality and behaviour are critically analysed to 
extract key concepts. Allocated and Achieved finality are also explored. A 
visualization of the discussion and application of finality and behaviour in 
this work is shown in Appendix 3. 
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 Chapter Three explains the methodology used in the research. It justifies 
the choice of the qualitative method of phenomenology. It also explains 
why data collections methods of focus group and interview were selected 
as suitable methods for achieving the research aims and objectives. It 
describes how the research work was planned, organised and executed. 
Limitations of the research effort are stated. 
 Chapter Four analyses data collected, describes demographics of 
participants, highlights presentation and coding of data. Data analysis 
looks at the subsystem- ships according to ownership, mission, design and 
construction, crewing and operations at sea. Emergent issues are discussed 
in the context of safety. 
 Chapter Five concludes the research showing how the pre-defined aims 
and objectives had been achieved. The Chapter gives suggestions for 
improving in system safety, contribution of the research to knowledge is 
























2.0 Introduction to Safety Concepts 
The concept of safety has shifted from one with mystic and religious origins 
to one reliant on statistics, human decision making, and technology 
(Berstein, 1998; Manuel, 2011). Safety is generically defined as a condition 
with no accidents, incidents, near misses, or where the likelihood of these 
occurring is low (Hollnagel, Wears & Braithwaite, 2015). The development 
of safety has been reliant on technology and conceptual modelling. Heinrich 
(1931) proposed the Domino model (earliest model) depicting accidents as 
caused by a unique initiating event leading to the fall of other dominos 
(failures). This is a sequential model of accident causation focusing on root 
causes of accidents as depicted in Figure 2 (Hollnagel et al., 2015). To 
satisfy the need for more complex linear systems (comprising latent and 
active failures), Reasons (1990) developed the Swiss Cheese model, an 
epidemiological model shown in Figure 3 (Hollnagel et al., 2015; Li, 




Figure 2: Linear/ Sequential models; Dominos in a series of failures and the 
Energy model by Haddon, (1980).  
 
 
Figure 3: Epidemiological models (Swiss cheese and Bow-tie models). Source: 
Hollnagel, (2008) and Khan & Hashemi, (2018). 
 
A shift in thinking from models with resultant outcomes to that of emergent 
outcomes triggered systemic models. Accordingly, the definition of safety 
changed from focusing on reducing negative events to one promoting positive 
events (Safety I – Safety II) (Hollnagel, 2014; Schröder-Hinrichs, Praetorius, 
Graziano, Kataria & Baldauf, 2015). Systemic models, such as Control theoretic 
and Confidence models, view the function of organisation, technology, human, 
and other elements as a whole (Hollnagel et al., 1999, 2015). Systems are therefore 
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defined as collections of elements or parts of a whole coherently organized with 
patterns of interconnection or structure that produce a characteristic set of 
behaviour to achieve a purpose or finality (Meadows, 2008).  
 
2.1 Review of Systems Theory  
Classic scientific approaches generally followed the reductionist or divide and 
conquer philosophy (Leveson, 2011).  The reductionist approach to science and 
problem solving involves breaking a whole entity into parts and addressing the 
problem of each part in isolation from the whole. This approach assumes that parts 
interact to produce a linear sum or predictable product. However, interaction 
between parts may produce emergent properties which may not be a direct sum of 
the parts (Meadows, 2008). As stated in Sufi teaching story “You think that 
because you understand ‘one’ therefore you must understand ‘two’ because one 
and one make two. But you forget that you must also understand ‘and’. Therefore, 
a holistic (systems) approach would provide better understanding and control of 
systems (Meadows 2008; Leveson, 2011; Caws, 2015). Furthermore, by 
considering the context of the system a thorough understanding of its dynamics is 
achieved. 
 
Ludwig von Bertallanfy (1968) applied systems thinking in his pioneering work 
in embryology and later mooted the concept of General Systems Theory (GST). 
GST seeks a unification of science and its approaches in all fields (von 
Bertallanfy, 1968). Systems theory has been applied by many scholars (Einstein, 
1934; Koffka, 1935; Boulding, 1956; Katz and Kahn, 1978; Checkland, 1981; 
Winter et al., 1995; Rapoport, 1997; Meadows, 2008; Levson, 2009; Kruglanski, 
Köpetz, Bélanger, Chun, Orehek & Fishbach 2013; Sevaldson, 2017; Dauchot, 
2018) in various fields (ecology, engineering, economics, anthropology, 
sociology, psychology, geography and the natural sciences) (Currie & Galliers, 
1999). Furthermore, Pomeroy and Jones (2006), applied systems approach in re-
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analysing 100 maritime accidents at sea to glean information on accident causal 
factors and latent failures that may have been missed in earlier investigations.  
 
Despite many applications, systems theory is yet to be applied in a study of 
warship, CG and commercial ship accidents. This work fills that knowledge gap. 
The seminal work by Rosenblueth, Wiener & Bigelow (1943) on behaviour is the 
point of departure of this research.  A detailed discussion on behaviour follows in 
the review of finality. 
 
2.2 Review of Finality in Systems Thinking 
Finality generally implies the purpose or goal(s) the system tends to achieve 
through behaviour (Castelle, Baugh & Bradley, 2015). In the literature there are 
variations of finality discussed as follows:  
 
 Equifinality: is the phenomenon of having multiple strategies leading to the 
achievement of a specific purpose (Katz & Kahn, 1978; Skyttner, 2005; 
Castelle, Baugh and Bradley, 2015). In embryology, the development of a 
normal organism from a whole ovum or fused ova is a classic example. 
Different initial sizes and courses of growth in organisms could result in the 
same ultimate size organism (Waddington, 1957; von Bertalanffy, 1968; 
Zelazo, 2013). 
 Multifinality: is the phenomenon of one particular strategy or action yielding 
different purposes (Castelle, Baugh & Bradley, 2015). Kruglanski et al., 
(2013), describe multifinality as one behaviour achieving multiple goals. The 
singular act of writing this review may seek to present an objective argument, 
impress the reader and defend an opinion (Kruglanski et al., 2013). 
 Counterfinality: is a phenomenon or event that negates/invalidates another 
event from achieving its end state (Turner, 2014). This concept has vast 
potential in understanding socio-technical systems such as shipping, which 
while stating “Safety First” has relatively poor safety standards. Radar was 
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introduced on ships to assist navigators in avoiding collisions. However, over-
reliance on Radar without applying time-tested navigational skills resulted in 
collisions leading to the coining of the term Radar-assisted collisions (Lee & 
Park, 2009; Schröder-Hinrichs, Hollnagel & Baldauf, 2012; Halpern, 2015). 
It is necessary to investigate the reciprocal link between behaviour and purpose 
(finality), highlighting behaviour as a determinant of finality.  
 
2.2.1 Behaviour of Systems 
Behaviour means any change of an entity with respect to its surroundings 
(Rosenblueth, Wiener & Bigelow, 1943). Aptly, behaviour is defined in four 
cardinal views: 
 Firstly, as the occurrence of an organism’s action, inaction or reaction. 
 Secondly, as a class of pattern of actions. 
 Thirdly, as group behavior.  
 Finally, as a change or movement of an object (Lazzeri, 2014).  
Moreover, behaviour is an emergent property of systems that includes 
adaptiveness, goal-seeking, resilience, self-organisation or evolutionary 
behaviour. Therefore, behaviour can be considered as a result of system functions 
and objectives (purpose, finality, teleology10, goals). Behaviour can, therefore, be 
based on system inter-relations and interactions. 
 
2.2.2 Classification of Behaviour  
Rosenblueth, Wiener & Bigelow (1943), in their further works on behaviour, 
make distinctions in behaviour of systems focusing on attributes such as active, 
purposeful, feedback controlled and predictive behaviour. This is shown in Figure 
4. 
 
                                                        
10 Fundamentally, Teleology is different from Finality. Teleology refers to a 
feedback driven purpose which leads to Finality as the ultimate end-state. 
 28 
 
Figure 4: Adapted from Bias Pathway in Behaviour Description (Source: 
Rosenblueth, Wiener & Bigelow, 1943). 
 
At lowest/first level, behaviour can be active or passive. Active behaviour means 
the object drives behaviour based on its energy, while in passive behaviour the 
object does not drive behaviour.  
At the second level, Active behaviour can be divided into purposeless and 
purposeful active behaviour. Purposeful behaviour is the action of behaviour 
directed towards achievement of a goal (Mandl, 2019), while purposeless 
behaviour is not directed toward a goal. The concept of purposeful behaviour is 
supported by Castelle, Baugh & Bradley (2015) in their work on system axioms. 
They described purposeful behaviour as the tendency exhibited by systems in 
seeking goals. A more recent study of purposeful behaviour by Axelsson (2019) 
viewed it in the context of ecological validity. The study considered the 
environment to be as important as the organism under study. Therefore, both have 
to be studied concurrently in order to understand the behaviour of the organism. 
This joins Brunswick’s (1952, 1955) claim that behaviours are probabilistic 
because the environment is non-deterministic.  
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At the third level, it is suggested that Purposeful behaviour may be feed-back 
driven (teleological) and non-feedback driven (non-teleological) (Rosenblueth, 
Wiener & Bigelow, 1943): 
 Non-Feedback behaviour means no signal is captured to adjust behaviour. 
 Feedback behaviour means that the studied system collects information on 
its behaviour to adjust it accordingly. For example, the continuous 
monitoring of ship’s position is a feedback loop because it leads the 
Officer of the Watch (OOW) to adjust the ship’s heading according to 
deviation from the expected route. Figure 5 shows a simple feedback 
system. 
 
Figure 5: Model of an open system with a feedback loop. 
 
At the fourth level, behaviour is Purposeful, Feedback driven and predictive. It 
means such behaviour exhibits predictive tendencies which could be divided into 
orders depending on the ability of the system to predict events. 
At fifth level, Predictive behaviour requires the manipulation of a minimum of 
two coordinates; one being temporal with the other spatial. This capability of 
systems is dependent on their sensory receptors (Observability capacity). 
De Florio (2014) reviewed two milestone works on systems behaviour by 
Rosenblueth, Wiener & Bigelow (1943), and Kenneth Boulding (1956) on 
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Systems in a social setting. De Florio identified five classes Random, Purposeful, 
Reactive and Social Behaviour. 
Castelle, Baugh & Bradley (2015) posit that system improvement could be 
achieved by studying the goals, goal-oriented behaviour functions and purpose of 
systems. 
  
Therefore, studying the goal oriented behaviour and purpose of different 
subsystem-ships will support an analysis of safety because behaviour is 
determined by systems structures and components as well as being goal-directed 
by its finality/teleology11. 
 
2.3 Safety Regulatory Approach 
Historically, maritime safety regulations were adopted after devastating accidents 
(Juda, 1977; Psaraftis, 2002; Schröder-Hinrichs, Hollnagel, & Baldauf, Hofmann 
& Kataria, 2013; Karahalios, 2017). Pomeroy, & Earthy (2017), state that though 
these regulations have improved the safety of ships, ship accident records have 
not improved recently. Others such as Bhattacharya (2009) opine that safety 
regulations have yet to achieve their full potential. Notwithstanding, there is the 
need to further improve their effectiveness. The Goal-Based Approach (Proactive 
Approach) is a laudable safety and risk approach (Ministral Rosa, 2018). 
Similarly, thorough safety investigation as mandated by the Casualty Investigation 
Code (2010), Regulation XI-1/6 of SOLAS, is one crucial way of improving the 
effectiveness of regulations (IMO, 2010). Additionally, it is useful to learn from 
other industries, but this approach is often dismissed because the maritime sector 
has unique conditions (Pomeroy, & Earthy, 2017). The concept of resilience12 in 
safety as proposed by scholars (Manuel, 2011; Praetorius and Lundh, 2013; 
                                                        
11 According to De Florio (2014), purposeful behaviour is considered as finality while predictive 
behaviour is considered teleology. However, as this work relates to purposeful behaviour including 
predictive and reactive, finality and teleology will be used synonymously. 
12 See Glossary for definition of resilience. 
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Praetorius and Hollnagel, 2014; Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2015; Jain, Reese, 
Chaudhari, Mentzer & Mannan, 2017) could improve safety of shipping. 
 
However, a practical case of shipping with very high safety standards would be a 
crucial model for improving safety. This review identified Pacific Nuclear 
Transport Limited (PNTL) ships to have a very high safety record (PNTL, 2019) 
and worthy of in-depth study. 
 
2.4 Summary 
Contemporary safety issues are viewed in a systemic approach. This study fills 
the knowledge gap by applying systems thinking to an analysis of warship, CG 
and commercial ship safety. Safety in systems is better understood through 
analysis of behaviour and finality. Counterfinality may be the reason why high 
safety is elusive in ship operations. Ship operations may exhibit purposeful 
feedback-driven or reactive behaviour. They may also be predictive or proactive 
in behaviour. Ships as socio-technical entities may exhibit social behaviour 
through their hierarchy, communication links and organisation. Safety regulation 
has evolved from reactive to proactive (GBS) in approach. Higher safety standards 
may be attained from studying a shipping system operating with risk level at as 


















3.0 Research Methodology 
Research could adopt various strategies or methods (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 
2010). The choice of a suitable method depends on the ability of the method to 
achieve the research aim and objectives (Gray, 2013). Qualitative methods were 
selected due to the quest of this research to investigate safety in shipping. 
Qualitative methods have desirable attributes in the ability to fit a context and 
reveal insights on a topic. They are easily applicable in a real world context and 
have the ability to address complex issues. Though qualitative research 
investigates a small number of cases, it examines those few cases in great detail 
and draws deep meanings (Mahoney & Goerts, 2006; Creswell 2014; Lune & 
Berg, 2017). 
  
Specifically, phenomenology approach was used in the research. Phenomenology 
enables the exploration of experiences of individuals to reveal the true form of 
phenomenon or attributes such as safety (Kafle, 2011). This enhances 
understanding and the possibility of developing credible solutions. However, there 
may be a gap between solutions from the research and what can actually work in 
real life. Manuel (2011) suggested that the insulated settings of theoretical 
research requires solutions or recommendations to be adjusted to fit the 
practicality of the real life shipping industry. The shipping industry is a socio-
technical system that requires practical measures to resolve its complicated 
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challenges. Solutions to such challenges should be descriptive and practicable. 
Qualitative approach, which enable in-depth study to give insights into novel 
topics or unexplored phenomena, is therefore used in this work (Panke, 2018). 
The most widely applied data collection methods of interviews and focus groups 
(Gill &Baillie, 2018) were used to gather sufficient perspectives on warship, CG 
and commercial ship safety. 
 
3.1 Focus Group  
A focus group is a well-planned series of discussions structured to gain 
perceptions on a particular subject of interest in a permissive, nonthreatening 
environment (Morgan, 2018; Young, 2019). Krueger & Casey (2015) assert that 
focus groups are successful because they produce useful results at a reasonable 
cost. A total of 6 focus group sessions were conducted in this study. Three sessions 
served as preliminary sessions and another three as main research sessions. The 
three preliminary sessions served as a "climate survey" and aided in planning and 
selecting the research theme and questions. 
 
The main research sessions formed the core of the work. Krueger & Casey (2015) 
opine that the purpose of focus groups should be clear and encourage discussions 
on ideas. They should also clarify opinions, and make recommendations on a 
course of action. The main research sessions had a clear purpose of collecting data 
to answer the research question. Discussions clarified biased opinions and ended 
with suggestions on ways to improve safety in systems. 
  
The sessions were founded on a three-stage strategy aimed at identifying trends 
and perceptions for effective comparison and contrast of data. The first focus 
group of the main research session provided an understanding of the topic; the 
second served as a pilot test and the third focus group (purpose-made) enabled 
evaluation of data as shown in Figure 6. Therefore, the findings in this research 








In such an exploratory study, the need for a benchmark for discussions was 
essential. PNTL, a member of the World Nuclear Transport Institute (WNTI), has 
incredible safety standards with a zero record of accidents (Chaplin, 2019), 
making it an excellent benchmark of “Safety First” for the whole maritime 
industry. This model of “Safety First” was developed from a one-on-one interview 
with a seasoned Master Mariner, with 26 years sailing experience (6 years as 
Master) on PNTL ships. To build a watertight model, the primary data gathered 
from the interview (primary source) were supplemented by data from internet 
sources (secondary source). 
 
This study followed a semi-structured interview approach using open-ended 
questions. This approach allowed the interviewee to respond without providing 
clues or setting boundaries on anticipated answers (Krueger & Casey, 2015). The 
non-directive approach enabled the development of a rich model. Deductively, 
practices, standards and measures which make PNTL ships operate at high safety 
standards could also make warships, CG and commercial ships safer. 
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On completion of the interview, extensive time was dedicated to manual 
transcription. Auto-transcription was not used since there are higher chances of 
error necessitating a re-transcription and equating the work effort to a manual 
transcription. Submitting the whole raw data from an interview to an online 
transcription service may not be ethical. Regardless, manual transcription 
provides the opportunity to review answers and glean subtle meanings, which may 
not be possible with auto-transcription. Additionally, manual transcription enables 
re-organization and effective structuring of answers to enhance meaning. Lecture 
notes from a series of four lectures presented on PNTL to the Maritime Safety and 
Environmental Administration 2019 class in World Maritime University were 
used to supplement the interview. 
 
3.3 Participants 
Focus group participants were selected based on professional experience, unique 
qualities and the ability to contribute rich information to the research purpose 
(Etikan, Musa & Alkassim, 2016). All participants in this research had maritime 
or maritime affiliated backgrounds.  
 
Moreover, the setting of all focus groups made participants feel comfortable; 
respected, willing and free to give opinions without judgement. There was 
spontaneous self-disclosure among participants, revealing what they really 
thought and felt. This was due to participants sharing similar backgrounds. 
Therefore, many opinions were offered towards the achievement of the research 
aim. 
  
Participants were introduced to the research topic and the respective methods 
(focus group and interview). Forms explaining research ethical and confidentiality 




3.4 Data Collection 
During focus groups, data was collected on whiteboards and organised in tables. 
Data collected was compared and contrasted without necessarily coming to a 
decision or consensus. All focus groups were supplemented with audio recordings 
and photographs. Photographs have a history of being effective tools in research; 
particularly in anthropology and ethnography (Flick 2006; Gray, 2009). 
Photographs capture details and are quicker than the human eye in recording facts. 
 
Data was collected with open-ended questions during both focus group and 
interview. The questions were sequenced from general to specific.  
Audio recordings, supplemented by notes, were the main tool for collecting data 
during the interview. Questions were carefully selected, sequenced and organised 
in the following thematic areas: 
 
 The owners of ships and maritime operations systems. 
 The main mission of each maritime operation system. 
 The critical safety design factors of the various ships. 
 The recruiting, organization and training of crew as individuals and a 
whole. 
 Certain critical operations conducted at sea. 
 The management of fatigue. 
 Factors considered in promotion of crew. 
 Sea time and its effect on crew fatigue and capability. 
 
3.5 Theoretical Orientation 
The theoretical orientation of the research is based on application of the 
highlighted concepts of systems theory in Chapters 1 and 2. As earlier stated, 
finality is derived from behaviour and not rhetoric or stated goals. Finality and 
behaviour are the main theoretical themes in this research. Equifinality, counter 
finality and purposeful behaviour are important facets of the two main themes 
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which guided this work. Additionally, allocated finality13 or “espoused theory” 
may differ from achieved (real-life) finality14 (Argyris & Schon 1996; McLaren 
2015). Therefore “safety first” can be the allocated finality of a ship, but not its 
achieved finality. 
 
3.6 Reliability, Credibility and Transferability 
Reliability and validity of such a research relies on its conformity with ethics, 
framing of data collection, analysis and the way findings are presented (Meriam 
& Tsidell, 2016). The researcher used thorough approaches in collecting data and 
applied systems thinking tools and matrices to analyse data and present findings 
in a sequential manner.  
 
To ensure credibility, participants were given transcribed copies of focus group 
sessions and interview to peruse for accuracy and correct if necessary. 
Transferability is proving that research findings could apply to different context, 
times and populations (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Statistics Solutions, 2019). 
Generalizability and transferability is deemed to be low in phenomenological 
studies (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 1997). The researcher enhanced 
transferability by giving “thick description”15 (Ponterotto, 2006) of the research 
settings and data collection methods.  
 
3.7 Research Ethics 
This research complied with WMU’s Research and Ethics Committee and 
generally accepted research ethics standards. Consent of participants was obtained 
and documented on a form prior to interview and focus group sessions. A sample 
of this form is in Appendix 5. To ensure transparency and gain confidence of the 
                                                        
13 See Glossary for definition of allocated finality. 
14 See Glossary for definition of achieved finality. 
15 See Glossary for explanation of thick description.  
 38 
interviewee, the purpose, essence, sequence, and future use of interview and focus 
group answers were explained. 
 
All research participants completed the consent forms after agreeing, without 
reservation, to partake in the discussions. Interestingly, participants were eager to 
offer answers and even provided unsolicited answers which enriched the research. 
Both the interview and focus groups exceeded their allocated time period and had 
to be stopped by the researcher.  
 
3.8 Limitations of the Study  
It would be shallow and hypocritical not to indicate that a novel study as this 
would be without limitations. The limitations influenced the definition of the 
research topic, data assessment, test for reliability and validity of data and choice 
of research methods. The researchers’ rationality of limitations was bounded and 
became relatively comprehensive upon completion of the study. 
 
3.8.1 Limitations of Qualitative Study 
Qualitative research is known to be limited by biases and subjectivity in opinions 
of respondents. Largely, perceptions may not be true and this is a limitation in 
obtaining objective results and fair analysis. Additionally, the results of a 
qualitative study may be limited to the context of the study and may not be 
applicable in other contexts which may even have similar characteristics. 
However, to gain insight into subjects it may be necessary to sacrifice 
generalization for precise investigation. 
 
3.8.2 Participant Perception and Rhetoric 
Perceptions of safety practices and standards in their system of operation may be 
higher than what really pertains. This may be due to the need to create a good 
perception or perpetuate rhetoric. These differences between reality and 
perception could have affected the study and were addressed by cross-examining 
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responses. Similarly, some participants intellectualized answers to make them 
seem thoughtful and reflective. However, real-life decision making is unconscious 
(Zaltman, 2003) and different from focus group answers. 
 
3.8.3 Experience of the Researcher  
The researcher, as a serving naval officer with some training in commercial 
shipping operations, tends to view answers with a bias based on experience. The 
particular tendency for the researcher to be prejudiced in assessing the safety 
standards of warships is high. Flick (2006), asserts that qualitative research data 
could be misinterpreted due to the influence of the researcher´s own opinion. 
However, this was addressed by having a moderator (supervisor) for the focus 
group who was a commercial ship Master with some naval experience and by 
reducing the researcher´s interview both in the focus group and interviews. 
 
3.8.4 Data limitations 
Though the researcher cited many cases of recent warship accidents, data from 
investigative reports was limited. Except for the US and Norway Navies, which 
show transparency, most navies have no open publications of accident reports or 
even official publication of accidents. More often, the work cites US and 
Norwegian accident cases because of the availability of information. 
 
3.8.5 Time Limitation of a Master’s Programme 
Data collection through interviews and detailed engagement with navy, CG and 
commercial shipping companies was limited by time since the research had to 
completed within the spate of 14-months for an MSC in WMU.  
 
3.9 Summary of Chapter 
The research used qualitative methods of focus groups and interviews to 
effectively investigate and collect data on the dynamics of safety on ships. These 
produced findings that fit the socio-technical industry of maritime operations. Six 
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focus groups, divided into two parts of three, were held. The first three set the tone 
for the research and the second three gathered data to answer the research 
question. An interview to build a model of “Safety First” on PNTL ships was 
conducted to serve as benchmark for analysis. 
 
All participants in the research had maritime or affiliated backgrounds. Data was 
collected using semi-structured questions in order to allow emergent opinions. 
Notably, allocated finality may not be achieved. Limitations were considered 






















This chapter presents and discusses the data, demographics of participants and 
data coding. The chapter focuses on data analysis and concludes with a summary 
of the analysis. 
 
4.1 Data Presentation and Participant Demographics 
To enhance clarity of presentation, data from the focus groups and interview are 
presented in tables as shown in appendices 2 and 4, respectively. Data are grouped 
under similar headings to enable easy correlation and analysis. 
 
4.1.1 Interview (PNTL Model) 
Data from the interview were sectioned into 5 themes: owners, mission, design of 
ship, crew, operations of ship at sea as well as emergent discussions. Emergent 
discussions centred on involvement of management and role of regulators in ship 
safety. The PNTL Model served as a benchmark of an organisation with safety as 
achieved finality. The organisation and operations of PNTL ships were used in the 
analysis. 
 
4.1.2 Main Focus Groups 
Tables in Appendix 4 are organised into 5 thematic parts: ownership and mission, 
crew, design of ship, operations at sea and emergent discussions. Each part 
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contains consolidated data from the focus groups (main research session). 
Participants of the focus groups had relevant seafaring expertise and experience 
in warship, CG and commercial ship operations. However, in some working 
groups, persons without seafaring experience also participated in discussions. 
Discussions were conducted on the following dates with persons grouped as 
indicated subsequently: 
 Focus Group 1 was held on 16 January 2019 with 8 students of Maritime 
Energy Management Class. Professionally, the 8 students represented a 
Captain of an oil rig, Chief Engineer, warship Captain, Second Engineer, 
Economist, Computer Engineer and two classification society Surveyors. 
These participants were from 8 different countries in Africa, Europe and 
Asia. 
 Focus Group 2 was held on 22 January 2019 with 22 students of Maritime 
Safety and Environmental Administration Class. The 22 students 
comprised 8 Maritime administrators, 7 Merchant mariners, 5 CG officers, 
2 Naval officers and 2 classification society Surveyors. Participants were 
from 20 countries in Asia, Africa, Middle East, the Caribbean, Pacific 
Islands and South America. 
 Focus Group 3 (Purpose-made focus group) was held on 4 June 2019 with 
9 persons selected based on their unique experience in warship, CG and 
commercial ship operation. The 9 persons included 3 persons each with 
experience in Navy, CG and Commercial ship operations. The group 
comprised a balanced spread of participants from 9 different countries 
across Middle East, Africa, Asia and South America. 
Participants from each category of maritime operations were interested in 
highlighting the negatives of the other categories while defending and boosting 
the positives of theirs. This shows the inertia of systems to learn from others. 
Therefore, participants had poor perspective of other modes of maritime 
operations. The moderator (research supervisor) and assistant moderator 
(researcher) had cross knowledge in the various areas discussed having undergone 
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training and served time on ships of different systems. This served to correct these 
misconceptions, which could have negatively impacted the research. The 
participants were actively encouraged to contribute opinions during the discussion 
and measures were taken to prevent the dominance of few individuals. Again, the 
discussions confirmed the theoretical background of the research given in the 
earlier three chapters indicating that behaviour is an indication of purpose and not 
rhetoric. 
 
4.2 Data Coding 
To enable clarity, colour codes were used to represent data found in multiple and 
individual focus groups. Green for multiple (2 or 3) focus groups, blue for focus 
group 1, red for focus group 2 and purple for focus group 3, in that order. The 
colour coding used in this research is based on Grounded theory (Burnard, Gill, 
Stewart, Treasure & Chadwick, 2008; Skjott Linneberg & Korsgaard 2019). 
Coding was used for focus group data only.  
 
4.3 Data Analysis 
The research used qualitative content analysis in studying data from documents, 
audio, video, and photographs (Hseih & Shannon, 2005; Verschuren & 
Doorewaard, 2010; Boréus & Bergström, 2017; Lune & Berg, 2017). Prior to the 
commencement of the purpose-made focus group, participants were required to 
indicate which category of ship was the safest. Most respondents indicated that 
they considered the ship environment or category they work in as safest, which 
shows that subjectivity influenced perception of safety. Additionally, individuals 
judged safety with a parochial view of their institution, without the ability to 




4.3.1 Analysis of Ownership and Mission as High Level Control and Finality 
Subsystem-Ships form important parts of maritime systems. Each system works 
to achieve finality and each subsystem participates in achieving the overarching 
finality.  
 
The owner can be assimilated as the control element because they have the 
ultimate power. They impose constraints in order to drive behaviour of ships 
towards achievement of the overarching company/organisational finality. Social 
systems such as private or public companies have mechanisms of control. Owners 
in social systems use various control mechanisms which could be formal (specific 
laws and processes) or informal (culture and traditions). Communication or flows 
(physical, monetary, etc.) are necessary to bind systems together and to ensure the 
effectiveness of the control. In our studied systems, control relies heavily on 
information distribution, written documents, verbal orders, resource allocation 
and supply systems. 
 
Notably, ownership of a system gives the legitimate power to determine the type of 
control mechanism to influence behaviour and to achieve allocated finality (Leveson, 
2011). Effective control ensures coherence and stability (through resilience) of the 
system. Control mechanisms in the Navy and CG are typically constructed as vertical 
hierarchies of command. In shipping companies, the top management, appointed by 
owners or shareholders, exercises control over the system and its subsystems. 
 
In order to assess the overall performance of a system (including its safety 
aspects), Leveson (2011) proposes a matrix of analysis highlighting the 
importance of feedback loops and controls. Therefore, the researcher considers 
that efficient control processes have to fulfil these four conditions:  
 
 Goal Condition. The controller must have a goal or goals.  FINALITY 
could be actually achieved or just rhetoric. Finality is the final state of the 
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goal. It is synonymous with Aristotle’s idea of “Final Cause” as stated in 
Pérez-Álvarez (2017). Though a specific finality could be stated (rhetoric), 
behaviour could lead to a different achieved finality. The achieved finality 
could counter the allocated finality. 
 Action Condition. The controller must be able to affect the state of the 
system, and have POWER over the system and its parts (Leveson, 2011). 
It is the ability to affect or influence the functioning of the system. 
 Model Condition. The controller must be (or contain) a model of the 
system (Leveson, 2011). It is ability to UNDERSTAND the system itself, 
its part and its functioning. Since this work is viewed in an open social-
technical system there is the need for participants (people) in the systems 
to contribute to the modeling of the system. The model so obtained would 
be a best-fit for the specific environment and not just a best model. 
 Observability Condition. The controller must be able to ascertain the 
state of the system (Leveson, 2011).  This entails the ability to COLLECT 
DATA and INFORMATION from parts of the system and subsystems. It 
shows the importance of feedback loops in systems.  
 
Additionally, effective systems control requires effective communication flows. 
Moreover, communication in the system does not only enable transmission of 
information but also binds the systems as a coherent unit. This binding ensures 
interaction between parts in order to form a complete whole having emergent 
properties. As per Leveson (2011), safety is an “emergent property of systems”. 
In this work, the ship being a subsystem, we can deduce that the safety of the 
overall system depends on the safety of each subsystem. The accidents involving 
KNM Helge Ingstad, USS McCain and USS Fitzgerald affected the overall Navy 
system (US Navy, 2017a; AIBN, 2018). This is identical in the context of shipping 
where a single casualty can damage the entire system. In the case of Herald of 
Free Enterprise or Exxon Valdez accidents, the entire network of related shipping 
companies (system) folded or changed ownership (MSA1894, 1987; NOAA, 
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2014). Safety is, therefore, important for survival of shipping institutions and 
navies. 
 
In open systems such as Navy, environmental factors need to be considered. A 
system environment is the immediate surroundings that interact with the system 
and can influence the functioning of the system. In this respect, the economic crisis 
in Argentina affected the allocation of resources to the Navy which ultimately 
impacted its vessels leading to a major disaster for a submarine (Woody, 2017; 
Archus, 2019). Indeed, a system component (e.g. a ship- subsystem) may function 
safely in an environment but could malfunction and cause accidents in another 
environment (natural, social, economic, political, and cultural).  
4.3.1.1 Warships in Navy-system 
Warships, as subsystems, have individual finality which forms part of the overall 
finality of the System-Navy. The Navy has other subsystems and components like 
network of buildings and people constituting administration, logistic support, 
medical care, repair yards, personnel accommodation, financial and training 
institution. Each subsystem has its own finality, which leads to the achievement 
of the overall finality of the System-Navy. At the centre of these subsystems is the 
control element (ownership) which is the Government or Ministry of Defence 
(MoD). MoD decides and exercises its control via strict hierarchy of command, 
which circulates information flows between all parts of the system in order to 
guide each part’s behaviour.  
Hierarchical mechanisms imply that there are at least two levels in the system. 
Navy systems and even subsystems have several levels of command, structured to 
facilitate task execution and relay of orders. A typical warship-subsystem 





Figure 7: Typical subsystem-warship Hierarchy or Command Structure. Based 
on British Navy and Commonwealth Navy structure. Source: Researcher 
 
Communication of policies, instructions, feedback and resources is attained 
through hierarchical structure. It is a two-way communication mechanism from 
higher command to lowest rank individuals and vice versa.  
Under government control, MoD acquires legitimate power over the System-Navy 
and set the necessary constraints to guide behaviour as determined or allocated. In 
rare cases, accidents occur which are largely out of the control of MoD or even 
warships. The earlier stated case of MT Sama running into a Taiwanese Frigate 
Ning Yang berthed in harbour shows an accident that MoD or the frigate could 
have done little to prevent (Strong, 2019). The four conditions in the warship 
context are as follows: 
 
 Goal Condition. The goal of the System-Navy is to protect State interests 
using the maritime domain (e.g. defence of national territory and the 
projection of national power abroad). This requires subsystem-warships to 
conduct combat operations against external aggression or other military 
(or non-military) vessels. Safety is not an allocated finality of subsystem-
warship but an essential condition for success in military operations. For 
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example, the US Navy in the Pacific maintains a combat force ready to be 
deployed for protection of US interests (Sputnik, 2015; US Pacific Fleet, 
2016). Therefore, it may be “mission first” in navies. However, such 
overseas deployment has cost implications and can lead to a drain on 
resources. The result would be a decision to make cutbacks which have 
possible negative effects on safety. 
 Action Condition. Action condition entails MoD’s ability to command 
and direct operations, administer personnel, manage and allocate 
resources, and promote, reward and punish undesirable acts. Generally, 
action condition is having power over the system to attain allocated goals. 
For example; the decision by the US Navy to train sailors according to 
standards in STCW could greatly improve training and performance of 
sailors (US Navy, 2017a). However, re-occurring accidents may be 
evidence of an insufficient action condition. On 22 April 2017, a fire 
incident occurred on Chilean warship Sargento Aldea during maintenance 
works on oxygen bottles for the ship’s infirmary. A similar explosion and 
fire incident re-occurred on 29 August 2019 on the same ship during 
similar maintenance but this time led to crew injuries (Sabado, 2017; 
Voytenko, 2019b). Some actions or influences may also lead to negative 
unintended effects. 
 Model Condition. A good model condition is the capacity of MoD or 
Navy Headquarters (NHQ) to understand the subtleties of subsystem-ship 
functioning. In socio-technical systems, model condition should be fitted 
to the environment or paradigm in order to be effective. Wrong 
understanding/construction of the model, the environment or the paradigm 
of operation may challenge the subsystem efficiency, performance or 
safety. To ensure models are as accurate as possible, participants in the 
operations of the model (Captain, watchkeepers and sailors) must partake 
in the refinement of the modeling.  
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A good warship Model condition can be achieved through enhanced 
communication flows between MoD or NHQ decision-makers and 
operators through trust and established feedback loops. For example, the 
decision of the Argentinian Navy to cut budgetary allocations to ships 
should have considered the specificities of submarines. Submarines have 
special propulsion systems and operate in an enclosed environment 
without escape. The investigation suggested that budgetary cutbacks and 
insufficient maintenance resulted in deterioration in the operational status 
of the submarine. The sinking of San Juan (S-42) has been attributed 
directly to a fire in batteries though budgetary cuts and wider 
organizational failure seems to be the main causes (Cropsey, 2017; 
Archus, 2019). Indubitably, Navy authorities knew the specificities of 
submarines but seemed unable to model the impacts of cutbacks on 
maintenance of such vessels. 
However, the Russian Navy changed its approach to integrate 
environmental changes. Contrary to the US Navy, the Russian Navy is not 
pursuing an interventionist strategy but rather intends to maintain a 
regional presence of small ships (Axe, 2019). Consequently, the Russian 
Navy has adapted its subsystems-warships accordingly. It is building 
smaller ships with a full load of armaments instead of large ships (Axe, 
2019). Following the sinking of the PD-50, a floating drydock which was 
used to maintain the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, Russian Navy HQ 
has planned to decommission the aircraft carrier (Kut, 2018). This shows 
flexibility in modelling warship operations but its impact on safety is yet 
to be observed. 
 Observability Condition. Observability in the Navy system is the ability 
of MoD or NHQ to accurately assess the status and confirm the proper 
functioning of any part of the system at any period. The formal feedback 
mechanism in Navies follows hierarchical communication and its multiple 
levels. This feedback structure could lead to distortion/disruption of 
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information, particularly in can-do cultures such as the US Navy (US 
Navy, 2017a). Can-do culture leads ship Commanding Officers (COs) to 
attempt challenging tasks with continually decreasing resources without 
questioning or complaining about related-risks. COs with Can-do culture 
are usually glorified as resourceful. This could gradually degrade the 
safety standards across the fleet, leading to series of accidents (possibly 
the case in the US Navy). US Navy High Command seemed not to properly 
understand the operational condition of ships deployed in the Pacific fleet 
as demonstrated by the casualty investigation concerning USS McCain 
and USS Fitzgerald (US Navy, 2017b). It shows a limited observability 
condition, missing feedback to top management on the true state of ships 
(US Navy, 2017a). Poor observability condition has been highlighted by 
an investigative report to the Argentine parliament as the cause of the loss 
of San Juan (Rey, 2019). Navies should consider multiple ways of 
gathering accurate feedback in order to ensure an appropriate level of 
operational demand on each part (subsystem) of the entire system. 
4.3.1.2 Coast Guard Ships in Coast Guard Institution-System 
Control in CG is often similar to that in Navy because some CG institutions are 
structured as military organizations under the MoD. The four control conditions 
analysed in the CG system are as follows: 
 
 Goal Condition. This condition involves policing and emergency 
response. These goals require specialized training, relevant equipment and 
sufficient resources. Notably, CGs goals are easily observable when 
achieved. CG and Naval goals could conflict, particularly in coastal 
maritime security (Bansal, 2008; Blickstein, Conley, Tannehill, Schendt 
& Etchegaray 2018). However, they share the same overall objective 
which is to protect State interests.  
 Action Condition. Similar to Navy, the controller of the system is CG 
Headquarters (CGHQ) which depends on government/Ministry (Defence 
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or Interior) decisions. The strict military hierarchy makes the control 
system mechanical, i.e., top-down and authoritative structure. During the 
2019 US federal breakdown, the USCG was affected by the lack of 
budgetary in-flows (Woody, 2019). This lack could have affected missions 
and general order in the organisation since salaries were also affected. In 
this respect, the Commandant of the USCG Admiral Schultz declared the 
commitment of USCG to fulfil its missions (relying on budgetary stock) 
while awaiting budgetary inflows (Woody, 2019). This example shows 
that the control structure of any system is heavily dependent on in-flows 
and stocks. A prolonged disruption of in-flow and empty stock would 
affect the overall command structure and the survival of the system. The 
decision to initiate actions also depends on in-flows of information as 
shown by the following example. The recent encounters and collisions 
between Chinese and Taiwanese ships have caused the Taiwanese CGHQ 
to decide to install anti-collision systems on 17 of its new ships (Martina, 
2019). This shows a good action condition which could improve safety of 
ships and crew as well as ensure effective patrols.   
 Model Condition. Model condition depends on the ability of CGHQ to 
model subsystem-ship function of saving lives, protecting the environment 
or enforcing regulations. Following the 2016 USCGC Thetis versus 
towing vessel Matachin accidents in Panama the model of operation of 
USCGC in the complex environment of the canal may not have been 
appropriate. The 2017 collision between USCGC Tampa versus tug boat 
Cerro Santiago (NTSB/MAB-17/22, 2016; NTSB/MAB-17/37, 2017) in 
similar conditions at night supports this position. 
 Observability Condition. Observability is also influenced by a vertical 
hierarchical structure. This may cause authority gradient which cripples 
the ability to gather accurate feedback. The collision between USCGC 
Cuyahoga and MV Santa Cruz II is a classic case of authority gradient 
where the Commanding Officer (CO) of the ship made an incorrect 
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assessment of the navigational situation (USCG, 1979). Due to the strict 
command structure on the ship, no crew member could give the CO 
feedback on the looming danger.  
 
4.3.1.3 Commercial Ships in Shipping-System 
Ship-owners or company16 are defined in international regulations as the control 
system of ships because they assume the “responsibility for the operation of the 
ship” either directly as owners or through subcontractors (reference to MLC, 2006 
and ISM Code). Here-after, shipowner/company represents all forms of private 
control over commercial ships. In this context, ships are subordinate to the power 
of company management.  
 
 Goal Condition. The specific goal of ships (subsystem) is to carry-out 
maritime activities in order to generate profits for shareholders. 
Shareholders have legitimate power and define management structures to 
remotely control and command ship operations. Shipping companies claim 
“Safety First” because it is a mandatory requirement allocated under the 
ISM Code (IMO, 2000). Despite the “Safety First” rhetoric, the behaviour 
of some ships may be in contradiction. It indicates that “Profit First” may 
be the real goal to attain. For example, Exxon shipping had “Safety First” 
as an allocated finality. However, the reduced manning levels and 
increased work load on crew generated the condition of unsafe practices 
(counterfinality) leading to the Exxon Valdez disaster (NTSB/MAR-
                                                        
16 As The ISM Code (#1.1.2) defines company as: the owner of the ship or any other organization or 
person such as the manager, or the bareboat charterer, who has assumed the responsibility for operation 
of the ship from the ship-owner and who, on assuming such responsibility, has agreed to take over all 
duties and responsibility imposed by the Code." 
 
The MLC 2006 defines shipowner as: the owner of the ship or another organisation or person, such as 
the manager, agent or bareboat charterer, who has assumed the responsibility for the operation of the 
ship from the owner and who, on assuming such responsibility, has agreed to take over the duties and 
responsibilities imposed on shipowners in accordance with this Convention, regardless of whether any 
other organization or persons fulfil certain of the duties or responsibilities on behalf of the shipowner.   
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90/04, 1990). Therefore, the goal of “Safety First” should be deduced from 
behaviour (conduct of the ship in ship operations) but not rhetoric. 
 Action Condition. This condition infers the ability of shipowners to 
influence the activities in the system. In commercial shipping, the capacity 
to influence is derived from owners’ rights. A shipowner decides on ship 
design and construction, type and areas of ship operation and activities. 
Shipowners also utilize hierarchical mechanisms. Though this hierarchy is 
usually bureaucratic and has limited number of layers, it does not often 
affect organisational effectiveness. In 1988, the Scandinavian Star under 
its owners had a fire incident resulting in chaotic firefighting due to 
inability of crew to communicate among themselves (Ulfsson, 2018). The 
ship was transferred to a new owner in 1990. The new shipowner decided 
to operate the ship on a new route, soon after acquiring it, without properly 
training its multi-national crew (Norwegian Official Report 1E, 1991). A 
fire incident on the ship’s first day of operation resulted in a similar chaotic 
situation due to the inability of crew to communicate amongst themselves 
and passengers, leading to the loss of 159 lives (Palmberg & Georgsson, 
2009; Ulfsson, 2018).  This shows an inability of the shipowner to take 
necessary action to positively influence the safety of the ship. Furthermore, 
the trend of fire on Ro-ro passenger/ passenger/cruise ships (Norman 
Atlantic, Carnival Triumph, Cruise Ship Caribbean Fantasy, Grande 
America, Viking Sky and Santika Nusantara fire) has continued over the 
years (Mileski, Wang and Beacham 2014; Shipdetective.com, 2019; 
Voytenko, 2019c; SFGATE, 2019; Savvides, 2019). There seems to be a 
lack of ability of shipowners to take necessary action to stop these fire 
incidents. The inability of action may be due to lack of commitment to 
safety. 
 Model Condition. This is the capacity to understand the system 
functioning in its particular environment. Basically the design and 
construction of the subsystem-commercial ship is based on the 
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understanding of shipowners. Since models are simplifications of the real 
world they are wrong (or have limited validity). Models of dynamics in 
systems explore what would happen if certain driving factors changed in 
certain ways. Such models ask “what if?” (Meadows, 2008). There was an 
ineffective model condition during the Torrey Canyon disaster. As the 
“what if?” of a passage through a short cut would have revealed the high 
possibility of the ship hitting an underwater rock. Conversely, PNTL ships 
have been optimally modelled to ensure “Safety first”. The “What if?” of 
an accident is reputation damage to the whole Nuclear industry. As such, 
safety is considered more important than the mission (transport of cargo). 
Additionally, former ship Masters are appointed into top management 
positions and have a major role in the safety management of ships. In a 
case where the security of the cargo is threatened, two ships sail in tandem 
to serve as distractions to would-be attackers. 
 Observability Condition in commercial shipping is necessary to allow 
shipowners to know exactly the state of the system at all times. This 
informs decisions on actions and redefinition of the model of operation. A 
classic case of observability in commercial shipping is the reporting of 
accident near misses. It is widely known that there is underreporting of 
near misses in shipping (Bhattacharya, 2011; Lappalainen, Kuronen & 
Tapaninen, 2012; VanderHoon & Knapp, 2015; Xue, Tang & Walters, 
2019). Near misses could inform taking of adequate corrective measures 
to prevent accidents. Additionally, feedback on safety hazards is limited 
by authority gradient leading to accidents as in the case of Bow Mariner 
(Bureau Enquetes –Accident/Mer [BEAmer], 2003). PNTL ships have an 
effective safety culture where the Master and crew are not blamed for near 
misses but rather given sufficient resources to correct those potential 
accident conditions. A good safety culture which encourages crew 
members to report possible safety hazards creates good observability 
condition.  
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4.3.1.4 Common trends in control mechanism 
 
 The Goal of warship, CG ship and commercial is “Mission first” and not 
“Safety First” as claimed or allocated. The design, crewing and operations 
of ships are highly dependent on owners who decide based on the purpose 
of the ship. 
 The action of owners to manage fatigue on ships is ineffective since it is 
still prevalent. Fatigue is a common cause of accidents. 
 Safety of ships is determined by the amount of resources committed by the 
owners. Reducing resource in-flow (ie, cutting budget, smaller crew, less 
time at sea) reduces safety level of ships. To maintain high safety levels 
ship operations, need to be re-modeled to suit their context. Participation 
of crew in modeling ship operations makes it more accurate which 
enhances safety. Ship operation should be modeled to fit the environment. 
 Institutional cultures such as authority gradient and strict hierarchies, as in 
Helge Ingstad, Cuyagoha and Bow Mariner, contribute to accident. Good 
observability conditions could be enhanced through crew feedback, 
encouraging crew to speak up when safety hazards are noticed.  
 
4.3.2 Analysis of Crewing of Ships 
The discussions in this session apply to warships, CG ship and commercial ships. 
  
 Group Think. Some scholars opine that Group think17 contributed to the 
events that unfolded in the Titanic disaster (Bureau Enquêtes- 
Accidents/Mer 2003; Manuel, 2011; Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2012). 
Similarly, the collision of Helge Ingstad could have been averted if any 
watchkeeper had reassessed the situation. That will enable taking action to 
avoid collision instead of assuming the ship was passing a stationary 
floating object to starboard.  
                                                        
17 See Glossary for definition of Group think. 
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 Magnitude of Recent Warship Accidents. Recent warship accidents 
were devastating. In the Helge Ingstad collision, Norway with 5 state-of-
the-art Frigates lost 20% of its naval combat capability (Larter & Sprenger, 
2018). The Argentine Navy with 3 submarine (Saunders, 2016), lost 30% 
of its fleet with the sinking of San Juan. Similarly the US Navy 
strategically maintains an average of 5218 operational ships and suffered 
loss/damage to 4 ships in 2017-2018 representing nearly 8% of its active 
fleet through accidents. A commercial shipping company with such losses 
or casualty could lose its competitive edge or even collapse. The high 
profile Navy accidents and investigation reports has raised concerns about 
training and experience, bridge operation, ship construction standards, 
maintenance, effects of budget adjustments, hierarchical structure and top 
level management, etc. 
 Human Element. It is claimed that between 70% - 90% of accidents are 
caused by human elements (i.e. operators) (Osés & Ventikos, n.d.; 
Mundin, 2015; Barnett & Pekcan, 2017). A critical examination of this 
statement may lead to certain fundamental questions (Soares & Teixeira, 
2001; Haraati-Mokhtari, 2007; Graziano, Teixeira & Soares, 2016). 
Indeed, every aspect of the shipping industry is constructed by humans, 
meaning all causes of accidents are due to the human element (IMO, 2003; 
Barnett & Pekcan, 2017). The ramming of a jetty by USCGC Cypress 
following a propulsion control computer failure could also be attributed to 
the human element (NTSB, 2017; Safety at Sea, 2019) – software 
designers. The implication of the human element (from operators to 
designers and decision-makers) in accident requires a holistic approach 
which could be facilitated by system thinking.  
 Systems Approach. System approach offers an effective way of viewing 
safety as an emergent property of systems. Recent accidents involving 
                                                        
18 https://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=146 
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Argentinean, Norwegian and US warships reveal systemic problems such 
as cutbacks on maintenance resources, poor leadership and safety culture 
caused by unsafe practices and insufficient training and experience. The 
development of Safety II culture (Hollnagel et al., 1999, 2015) requires 
top management, leadership and the active participation of all crew 
members. Safety II19 focuses on successful or good safety practices and 
seeks to enhance those desirable practices. The application of Safety II 
concepts to warships, CG and commercial ships reveals organisational 
(systemic) influences on safety culture on ships (subsystems). Therefore, 
Safety II is a useful concept in system thinking. 
 Liability. The practice of apportioning full blame to individual crew 
members may lead to counter-finality because it cuts the link between the 
individual and the system inside which his/her actions were pre-
determined. Therefore, no systemic investigation is conducted. 
 
4.3.3 Analysis of Ship Design and Construction (Trade-offs) 
Generally, ship design and construction are determined by the intended purpose 
of the ship. The design and construction of warships, CG and commercial ships 
may, therefore, be similar or significantly different. Below are presented some key 
characteristics discussed by the participants of the focus groups. 
 
4.3.3.1 Warships 
 Subdivision and Aesthetic. Warships are designed with high subdivisions 
to enable isolation of compartments to withstand combat damage. It causes 
a reduction in aesthetic appeal of these compartments. Therefore, sailors 
on such warships have to squeeze through tight spaces and move through 
several compartments, possibly increasing crew fatigue. Better fatigue 
management would be facilitated with an optimal balance between decent 
                                                        
19 See Glossary definition of Safety I and Safety II. 
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accommodation and adequate compartmentalization. Further, better crew 
rotation could limit fatigue. 
 Structural Strength and Hydrodynamic hull. Warships are built to be 
slender with a relatively smaller width to enhance maneouvrability and 
hydrodynamic capabilities. In such design trade-offs, structural strength 
and damage survivability may be affected. The sinking of Helge Ingstad 
raised concerns (Larter & Pine, 2018) because it was expected that a 
warship should have sufficient damage stability. 
 
4.3.3.2 Coast Guard Ships 
 Specialised and Multi-purpose. CG ships are usually small or medium 
size vessels but fully equipped with the tools and systems needed to 
perform specialized missions. Considerations in the design of these ships 
may involve a trade-off between spare room for rescue and equipping the 
ship for specialized missions. 
 
4.3.3.3 Commercial Ships  
 Tonnage and Compliance with Regulation. The Tonnage Management 
Convention (1969) incentivizes ship owners and designers to shrink 
enclosed spaces which may be detrimental to safety, comfort and 
equipment/machinery spaces. This trade-off between tonnage and safety 
raises safety concerns and affects the occupational health and safety of 
crew (increases chances of fatigue). 
 Subdivisions, Redundancy and Cargo Carrying Capacity. SOLAS, as 
a constraint, requires ships to have a certain number of subdivisions based 
on their length. Naturally, shipowners want ships with larger holds that 
can carry cargo efficiently in bulk. It may even be required to construct 
bigger ships, taking advantage of economies of scale, without thoroughly 
analysing the structural stresses on such large ship. The fracturing into two 
and sinking of the MOL Comfort on 11 July 2013, is an example of trading 
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off between structural strength for cargo carrying capacity (Bahamas 
Maritime Authority, 2015; Jiang, 2015). A trade-off between objectives or 
constraints, therefore, leads to an optimal design (Olcer, 2019). The final 
design may lean more towards one objective, which may be based on the 
decision of a moderator considering owner preferences, marketable 
design, route to be used or availability of cargo handling equipment in 
ports to be visited. High number of subdivisions balanced with decent crew 
accommodation is a feature of PNTL ship design, making them safe. 
Additionally, PNTL ships have redundancy in systems (alternative means 
of propulsion, steering, navigation and emergency response). However, 
redundancy20 takes away cargo carrying capacity from a commercial ship.  
 Equipment and technology. Accidents caused by over-reliance on 
technology have been termed Computer-assisted. These include Radio 
Detection and Ranging/ Global Positioning System/ Automatic 
Identification System/ Electronic Chart Display Information System 
(RADAR/GPS/AIS/ECDIS) collisions or accidents. The 1956 collision 
between Andrea Doria and Stockholm, where both ships navigating in 
dense fog collided after Andrea Doria misinterpreted the actions of 
Stockholm is an excellent case of Radar-assisted collision (Mattsson, 
,2003). Similar misinterpretation of GPS and AIS data or false AIS data 
could lead to GPS or AIS- assisted collision (NTSB, 1997; Spaans, 2003; 
Cockcroft, 2003). An ECDIS-assisted grounding occurred on 14 July 2014 
when the ro-ro passenger ferry (ROPAX) Commodore Clipper ran 
aground because the crew over-relied on ECDIS (MAIB, 2015; Nielsen, 
2016). These show poor application of technology in shipping. 
The ergonomics of bridge systems on US warships has been considered as 
a contributor to serious collisions because it was challenging to operate 
and interpret them (US Navy, 2017a; US Navy, 2017b; Eckstein, 2019; 
Villalovos, 2019). Specifically, the collision between the USS McCain and 
                                                        
20 See Glossary for definition of redundancy. 
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Alnic was due to the inability of a sailor to properly operate the helm and 
throttle controls (US Navy, 2017b) leading to a “Touch-screen assisted 
collision”. The need to ensure simplicity in human-technology interface 
(Leveson, 2011) should not be traded-off when designing and installing 
ship sensors and equipment. 
 
In short, design and construction are determined by the system control power often 
without or with limited input of the operator (crew). Therefore, the frontline 
operators are trapped to function in a setting and with equipment which may not 
be well-suited for the operation of ships.  
 
4.3.4 Analysis of Ship Operation 
Ship operations which are considered as the behaviour of ships are analysed 
subsequently. 
 
4.3.4.1 Warship Operations 
 Combat Operations. Warships are primarily designed and operated for 
combat. Security may be the essential element in warship operations 
though safety is an important factor for successful completion of missions. 
It is worrying that warships are regularly colliding or grounding during 
exercises in peacetime. Effective consideration for immediate operational 
environment and traffic (ie, situational awareness) could improve warship 
safety. 
 Training Exercise. Most Navies and Military organizations conduct 
training in line with doctrine (Hebbar, 2019). The common concept is to 
train as you would fight. Training is designed to reflect as much of reality 
as possible, including the simulation of risks and hazards. This doctrinal 
foundation makes warship operations inherently risky and, consequently, 
prone to accidents. Inadequately supervised training exercises/ simulations 
in the real world environment could lead to costly accidents. Helge Ingstad 
had taken unacceptable risk, transiting at 17 knots in a narrow fjord during 
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navigational training (Mizokami, 2018b; Wijnen, 2018). Even more 
troubling was the absence of the Captain or very experienced navigators 
from the bridge during a risky navigational manoeuvre (Newsbreezer, 
2018). Additionally, the Italian Frigate Federico Martinengo collided 
during training on a night mission (Voytenko, 2019a). These are few 
examples of major casualties during training at sea. Strict monitoring of 
the environment could have mitigated the risk involved in this training. 
 
4.3.4.2 Commercial Ships Operations.  
Commercial ships readily justify their existence by generating revenue when at 
sea. The need to deliver cargo at a quicker rate and the desire for higher profit 
margins may result in disregard for safety in operation. As such, the need for an 
optimal trade-off between maximising efficiency of cargo transport and safety of 
ship operations in line with Efficiency Thoroughness Trade Off (ETTO) principle 
by Hollnagel (2009). 
 
In short, operational environments and their risks may become secondary because 
the control structures expect the fulfilment of its agenda (military training or 
commercial pressure) and imposes it on ships’ commanders/masters who usually 
do not resist. Such situation may increase risk level of the entire maritime 
operation system within a specific environment. 
 
4.4 Emergent Discussions 
Though not initially considered as themes in the research, sea time, promotion in 
rank and fatigue emerged through discussions and are included herewith.  
 
4.4.1 Analysis of Fatigue 




4.4.1.1 Warships and Coast Guard Ships 
 Manning levels and Rest Hours. Comparatively, warships and CG ships 
have large crew sizes. Helge Ingstad had a crew of 137 compared to the 
23 of MT Sola TS, though the warship was about 5130 tons and the Tanker 
was about 62,000 tons (Mizokami, 2018c; AIBN, 2018). It is interesting 
that a tanker more than 10 times the tonnage of a warship had just about 
one-sixth its crew. This is understandable because their missions differ: 
warships need to continue their operations even when casualties occur 
during combat while cargo shipowners tend to minimize operating 
expenditures concerning crew. 
Despite large crew, fatigue has been known as a contributory factor in 
warship accidents. The Captain of Helge Ingstad had his sleep interrupted 
four times during the night of the collision (Newsbreezer, 2018) affecting 
quality of sleep. Unadjusted watchbill21 scheme also contributed to crew 
fatigue in the Fitzgerald, Antietam and McCain accidents (US Navy, 
2017a). The US Navy has therefore adopted a circadian rhythm watchbill 
scheme (shift system) which considers the routine of the specific ship 
involved.  
 
4.4.1.2 Commercial Ships 
 Manning Levels.  The logic behind manning choices is to reduce crew 
related expenses. Unsurprisingly, fatigue is considered as a major 
contributor to marine casualties (UK MCA, 2016). Though fatigue in the 
maritime sector is regulated internationally by IMO (STCW) and ILO 
(MLC), the incidence of fatigue among seafarers is currently unabated. As 
stated by Bhattacharya (2009) ineffective management by shipping 
companies, particularly of the ISM code, may be the cause. Therefore, 
more effective management should consider the socio-economic and 
                                                        
21 See Glossary for Watch bill definition. 
 63 
organisational factors as well as encourage the participation of seafarers in 
safety management. 
 Underreporting of Rest and Work Hours. Several researchers (Smith, 
2007; Lützhöft, Thorslund, Kircher & Gillberg, 2007; Allen, Wadsworth 
& Smith, 2008; Grech 2015; Anund A et. al., 2015; Chembukkavu, 2017; 
NEPIA, 2017) have suggested that seafarers and shipping companies 
underreport rest hours, rendering regulations on rest and fatigue 
ineffective. Basically, larger crews on ships would be an effective way to 
improve safety.  
 
In short, fatigue both in Navy and Commercial shipping must be properly 
recognized and addressed by the authorities having the power to select appropriate 
crew quantity and quality as well as to adjust work organization to avoid cognitive 
impairment.  
 
4.4.2 Analysis of Promotion 
Promotion serves as motivation for various actions which could support the 
attainment of an assigned finality or even counterfinality. 
 
4.4.2.1 Warships and Coast Guard Ships 
Officers and Sailors on warships are promoted as in most military organizations. 
Promotion to senior ranks requires individuals to engage in some level of 
interaction with top ranking officials. Promotion of senior officers to top positions 
(Commodore and Captain of Capital Warships) in the Navy and CG is authorized 
by political authorities. Consideration for promotion includes time served ashore 
as well as time served aboard ships.  
 
Watchkeepers are usually required to pass an examination (theory and practical) 
before they are promoted to sensitive ship borne appointments. Though a 
watchkeeper may pass an examination for a position, they might not have gathered 
 64 
the necessary experience. To correct this, the US Navy has abolished the 
deployment of Surface Warfare Officers (seafarers) on staff appointments 
(LaGrone, 2018). Improperly considered promotion, may lead to appointment of 
low-experienced officers as Captain of ships. 
 
4.4.2.2 Commercial Ships  
Seafarers on Commercial ships are promoted based on similar criteria. They are 
required to obtain Certificates of Competencies which legally require minimum 
training and experience. Mostly, seafarers would have gathered the needed 
experience since most parts of their career would have been spent onboard the 
ship. To comply with shipowners demands or supposed expectations, some 
seafarers and captains may engage in unsafe practices such as underreporting rest 
hours and disregarding safety management practices. 
 
In short, though promotion of seafarers serves to encourage efficiency, it could 
lead to unsafe practices and accidents if wrongly done. 
 
4.4.3 Analysis of Sea Time 
Sea time provides all seafarers to build experience and proficiency. 
 
4.4.3.1 Warship and Coast Guard Ships 
The lack of adequate experience in operating ship systems and proficient decision 
making capability could be the result of lack of adequate sea time. The US and 
Norway Navy accidents showed that watchkeepers lacked the capability to take 
decisions during critical periods. Mainly these warship versus commercial ship 
collisions seemed to be caused by the meeting of inadequately experienced 
warship watchkeepers and very fatigued commercial ship watchkeepers. It is 
critical to note that lack of experience and fatigue are organizational failures. 
Solutions to this problem need to be taken from a system perspective.  
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The structure and organisation of Navy or CG institutions make it challenging for 
personnel to accrue sufficient time at sea. Comparatively, as at 24 July 2019 
Maersk owned 316 ships and operated 730 ships with about 89,000 employees 
(Statista, 2019; MoverDB.com, 2019). The US Navy also had 43 ships deployed 
on missions and a total of 290 ships with 336,978 personnel (Navy.mil, 2019). 
Therefore, warships have high crew-to-ship ratio affecting rotation of personnel 
on ships and in watchkeeping functions. 
 
Warship and CG ships supplement inadequate sea time with extensive use of 
simulators. However, over-reliance on simulators may erode certain time-tested 
practices (looking out of bridge windows or conning from bridge wings) limiting 
the ability of seafarers to appreciate real-life scenarios (situational awareness). 
Over reliance on simulators or the use of unrealistic simulators may produce 
“simulated seafarers”, seafarers who lack the rudiments of navigation.  
As pertains to PNTL ships, Navy and CG authorities should consider attaching 
seafarers to commercial ships for specific periods of time to build experience in 
real operational context. 
 
4.4.3.2 Commercial Ships 
Commercial ships spend almost all their time at sea. The longer time at sea 
increases exposure to accidents. Due to intensity of commercial activities, ship 
maintenance or/and familiarization of newcomers may not be conducted as 
expected. Additionally, simulators used for training in Maritime Education and 
Training (MET) institutions (RADAR/ARPA/ECDIS/Engine Control Unit 
simulator training) are often different from the equipment on board ships. The 
seafarer could then be on ships with very different navigational equipment without 
prior familiarization.  
 
Therefore, while exposure to real situations at sea may be complicated for military 
staff, the incapacity to train prior to joining a ship often affects ability of seafarers 
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to properly use shipborne equipment. In both cases, the solution requires the 
system and its control structure (management) to determine adequate solutions.  
 
4.5 Recap of Research Questions 
To enhance clarity of the findings of the research, a recap of the research questions is as 
follows. The key findings and summary of the chapter are structured as the answers to the 
research.  
 How the finality of warship, CG and commercial ships influences ship 
design and operation? 
 Which institutional framework/culture predisposes ships to accidents? 
 What are the strengths and weaknesses in warships, CG and commercial 
ship operations when considered as sub-systems? 
 
4.6 Overview of Key Findings 
The key findings of this research are highlighted as follows: 
 
4.6.1 Paramount ownership and mission 
Governments/shipowners have been identified as the owners of their respective 
systems. They hold power and allocate the main missions. For example: 
shareholders hold the legimate power in companies and organize it according to 
their needs and believe. In Navy and CG, the power originates from the Ministry 
through a military or police structure.  
Control mechanisms are developed to ensure that the goals determined by the 
owners of the systems are achieved. In each system, the control mechanisms are 
organised and distributed differently but their aims remain to control subsystems 
and to alter them when deemed necessary.  
In maritime domain, the control mechanisms are top-down and hierarchical in 
nature (e.g. from ministry of defence to officers then to sailors). Higher 
hierarchical levels have ultimate power to modify the missions of each ship 
through the allocation of (or not) resources. This therefore enhances or degrades 
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safety at any stage of a ships life cycle, from design/construction to operation of 
ships.  
 
In short, the finality (missions) of warship, CG and commercial ship are allocated 
by owners (Government or shipowners). Owners seem to consider “Mission First” 
(Combat, Protection or Profit) above other consideration. This motivates owners 
to build and operate ships to mainly achieve allocated missions. Safety may only 
be a condition to achieve “Mission First”. Missions, as allocated finality, 
determine the design and operation of ships. Ship design and operations are more 




4.6.2 Institutional framework/culture predisposes ships to accidents 
Each of the 3 systems of maritime operations has unique frameworks and cultures. 
These frameworks and cultures have been historically and socially determined by 
the respective missions of each system.  
 
4.6.2.1 System-Navy 
System-Navy has a strict hierarchy to enable effective command and control in 
(life-threatening) combat operations. This hierarchy has consequences such as in 
training operations: 
 Military doctrine requires training to be conducted as real-time combat 
operations. Such training at sea could lead to taking unacceptable risks. 
However, not taking adequate risk mitigation measures, related to the 
maritime environment, may create conditions for accidents.  
 A Can-do culture could generate risk acceptance. Limited government 
funds may affect ship maintenance despite requiring ships to operate at 
optimal levels. A case in point is the loss of the Argentinean submarine. 
Cutbacks can also affect capacity to effectively train crew at sea. 
 
4.6.2.2 System- Coast Guard 
System-Coast Guard has similarities with Navy. However, CG crew are usually 
more exposed to the sea environment because their missions (police, SAR and 
pollution response) occur more frequently (and more often than war). So, CG crew 
are regularly mobilized in to conduct real operations causing them to acquire 
adaptive and reactive skills which are needed in operation at sea. The attainment 
of CG goals, through operations, is readily seen by the public and concerned 
authorities. Consequently, budgetary cuts immediately affecting the capacity of 
the CG units to perform their missions may trigger public outcry. 
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4.6.2.3 Systems-Shipping 
System-shipping is internationally regulated. These regulations provide a network 
of measures to mitigate uncontrolled race toward profit-making. However, the 
regulations are not exempt from loopholes. For instance, reduced manning levels 
for cost efficiency causes crew to over work, creates fatigue and possible 
accidents. Ineffective safety management, blame culture and job insecurity may 








4.6.3 Strengths and weaknesses of warships, CG and commercial ships 
operations 
Though the research commenced with this idea, it was soon realised that it is 
shallow to attempt a comparison. Each ship relates to a specific system and 
operates within a unique context. It signifies that different networks of interactions 
exist and affect each ship differently. Additionally, each vessel is subject to 
different orders (levels as shown in Figure 4) of finality (purpose).  
Therefore, the research cannot compare the sectors but rather gives insight into 
understanding these categories of maritime operations and their safety limitations 
which are inherent to the system they are in. 
 
However, it is good to study the best safety practices used in the three categories 
of shipping to cross-fertilise ideas. This should be done by adapting the practices 
to best-fit the particular context and environment of maritime operations.  
 
4.7 Summary of Chapter Four 
Each subsystem-ship interacts with the entire system and its parts. Ship operations 
are related to the system structure and functioning because the system and its 
control mechanisms determine how the ships are designed, built and operated. 
Therefore, numerous reciprocal interactions exist between ships and systems. 
Each ship category exists in its own system and cannot be studied in isolation or 
compared one by the other.  
 
The interaction between ships and their respective system has to be understood 
particularly in relation to safety. As safety is an emergent property of a system 
(Leveson, 2011), enhancing safety requires studying the system as a whole within 
its environment and contexts.  
Due to the uniqueness of each system, importing ready-made solutions could be 
counter-productive if not preliminary absorbed and adapted to the system’s 
specificities and constraints.  
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Notably, none of the three subsystems under consideration can be considered as a 
reference for the others but each of them can inspire better practices.  
 
The control mechanism of PNTL ships has been designed to ensure maximum 
safety of ships. The overall PNTL system is committed to safeguard ships in 
operation. Resources are mobilized to achieve this finality and it is achieved by 
enhanced ship design and optimized crewing and operation. This satisfies the 
unstated mission to preserve by all means the reputation of the nuclear industry 





























CONCLUSIONS AND SYSTEMIC SUGGESTIONS 
 
5.0 Introduction 
This final Chapter concludes the work and provide some systemic suggestions.  
 
5.1 Conclusion of Research Work 
Finality, behaviour and control mechanisms were the main systems thinking 
principles used in the analysis. The analyses were structured according to a matrix 
of goal, action, model and Observability conditions. Emergent discussions were 
also analysed and deductions made leading to key findings.  
 
In a simplified analysis, the trend of warships versus commercial ships accidents 
seems related to insufficient experience of warship watchkeepers and fatigued 
commercial ship watchkeepers.  
 
As pertains in PNTL ships, which have allocated and achieved finality of “Safety 
First”, inexperienced or fatigued watchkeepers do not exist because the system 
behaves to avoid such risky situations.  
 
The application of systems thinking in this research revealed that accidents were 
caused by interactions between elements in the system and subsystems. It also 
showed that the safety of a system is influenced by its context and environment. 
The importance of a comprehensive and properly organised higher institutional 
framework should not be ruled out. These validate systems thinking as a potent 
tool to investigate operations of Navy, CG and Commercial shipping in order to 
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improve their safety. Further research in this topic is necessary to enhance the 
validity of systems thinking in safety improvement. 
The following suggestions complement the conclusion by providing directions of 
analysis and further research. 
 
5.2 Suggestions on Changing System Behaviour to Enhance Safety 
This novel research has uncovered some practicable ideas capable of addressing 
some challenges in maritime operations, which are deeply embedded in system 
functioning. 
  
Regardless, the studied systems of maritime operations have built stock over time 
which has created system inertia. Therefore, major system modifications may not 
be easy. However, some minor changes in a system, in appropriately chosen areas, 
may generate major modifications.  
 
Forester, as cited in Meadows (2008), asserts that to enable system changes, 
leverage points need to be identified and used. Leverage points are places in 
systems where a relatively small change can cause large alterations. 
  
Improving safety will require adjusting elements of the system. In this respect, 
Meadows (2008) proposed 12 factors to be considered in order to alter system 
behaviour. Each factor requires different levels of commitment. The factors are 
on a scale which increases from 12 to 1: 
 In factor 12, the changes are easy to accept (so easy to implement) but 
have marginal impacts.  
 In factor 1, modifications require structural adjustments which are 
challenging to initiate but may trigger major effects on system behaviour.  
These recommendations are considered in System-Navy as it is the main concern 
in this exploratory work. For each factor, numerous adjustments may exist but 
selected examples are given due to research limitations. Extensive analysis to 
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adjust each factor would require intense work and the contribution of Navy 
stakeholders to identify and select the best options. However, that is beyond the 
scope of this research.  
 
Factor 12 
Numbers – Constants 
and parameters. 
Meaning in Context of Navy 
Change the numbers of 
elements in the system. 
 Iincreasing redundancy to overcome deficient 
elements (technical, procedural, human, etc.). 
 Increasing time at sea for watchkeepers. 
 Increasing navy budget to ensure optimal 
maintenance, training and sufficient periods at sea 
for each ship and crewmember.  
 Modify procedures for appointing watchkeepers 
(e.g. to favour longer sea time).  
 
Factor 11 
Buffers – The sizes of 
stabilizing stocks 
relative to their flow. 
Meaning in Context of Navy 
Stocks stabilize system 
but increase their 
inertia. 
Too big a buffer, such as isolated Navy culture, 
makes a system rather inflexible and liable to fail. 
There is the need to manage stocks and flows of 
new ideas and cultures. 
 Integrating STCW requirements in naval training 







Structures – Physical 
systems and their nodes 
of intersection. 
Meaning in Context of Navy 
Optimal construction 
and efficient 
management of resource 





 Create mutual flow of safety ideas (best practices) 
between Navy and other military forces as well as 
with Navy and Commercial shipping. 
 Consider ergonomics of navigation equipment. 
 Enhance comfort on warship to reduce fatigue. 
Though stock and flow changes can improve 
warship safety, systems take time to change. 
 
Factor 9 
Delay – the lengths of 
time related to the rate 
of system changes 
Meaning in Context of Navy 
Delay suggests time 
required to absorb 
changes at appropriate 
moment without 
destabilizing the system.  
 Estimate time to train watchkeepers according to 
STCW if considered in novel training scheme in 
Navy.  
 Manage crew fatigue by adjusting watchbills. 
 Installation of new equipment should require time 












Meaning in Context of Navy 
Feedback required for 
system equilibrium or 
ensuring goal-seeking 
objective. Feedback 
loop to verify the system 
is in appropriate track. 
 Reporting of incident and accidents should be 
effective to indicate areas for improvement. 
 Crew fatigue, health, recreation and socialization 
should be constantly monitored to ensure crew 
efficiency. 
Feedback to achieve the system goal is good but 





Meaning in Context of Navy 
Self-improving 
feedback. 
 Near miss reporting should be incentivized to 
reinforce feedback from onboard safety. 
 Safety performance and experience at sea should 
prevail in promotion to ship officer appointment. 
 Ships with good safety records should be given 
recognition. 
Strengthening safety-related feedback should be 
promoted. High safety performance should be 
appreciated. Both would demonstrate the focus of 









Information Flows Meaning in Context of Navy 
Where information goes 
and who gets the right 
information. 
 Facilitates communication beyond traditional 
hierarchy gap. 
 Promote unusual reporting systems such as 
anonymous feedback with whistleblowers 
protections. 
 Enhance transparency such as information flow, 
decisions, budgets, etc. 
 
Factor 5 
Rules – Incentives, 
punishments, 
constraints. 
Meaning in Context of Navy 
“The rules of the system 
define its scope, its 
boundaries and its 
degrees of freedom.”  
 Develop rules considering “Safety First” during 
peacetime training and non-combat missions even 
when against the doctrine. Avoid Can-do culture 
in peace time. 
 Establish an independent safety department. 
 Consider new rules and transparent mechanisms 
for promotion of staff throughout their carrier. 
 Create rules on accident investigation (e.g. open 
investigation to non-navy staff) and transparent 
distribution of reports.  
 Consider rules to eliminate blame-culture. 
 Provide complain procedures and ensure 









 Empower all crewmembers in ship safety. 
 Allow crew and stakeholders to construct safety 
(e.g. decisions related to ship design, appointment 
of staff and operation)  
 Allow ship command and crew to take 
autonomous safety decision.  
 
Factor 3 
Goals – the purpose or 
function of the system. 
Meaning in Context of Navy 
  Identify the achieved finality and not allocated 
finality by assessing behavior of the overall 
system. 
 Assess the importance of experience at sea in 
promotion to ship command positions. 
 Review privileges in resource allocations. 
 Question the meaning of Navy in peace time and 












Paradigms – the mind-
set in which the system 
arises 
Meaning in Context of Navy 
Fundamental mind-set 
or deep understanding 
of a system. Unstated 
assumptions of a 
systems’ foundation. 
 
 Question if Navy should participate in income 
generation by multiplying its commercial 
activities 
 Consider the stability of employment in Navy and 
outsource functions such as navigation, 
maintenance, catering, etc. Special arrangements 
should be made for wartime. 
 Consider novel ship design to extend operational 
profile: war, CG and limited commerce 
(feeder/breakbulk services with navy auxiliary 
vessels). 
 Design warship with wood and sails. This reduces 
operational cost and allows longer time at sea. 
 Enhance management and high management 
responsibility regime. As in the philosophy of 
Jonas (1984), power implies responsibility. 
 Explore the possibility of reporting serious safety 
issues to MoD/Prime Minister’s office without 
passing through Navy filter. 
 Modify the command system on ships to be based 
on competency and experience more than rank.   
 Think ship operation and crew as an organic 








Meaning in Context of Navy 
Flexibility in 
transcending paradigms. 
 Question the Navy model in use (former colonies have 
imported models)?  
 The necessity of Navy functions in the current era of 
weapon systems?  
 The employment of Navy in meeting a nation’s 
maritime needs?  
 Consider the transformation of Navy into another type 
of force to enforce law, ensure security and protect 
national interest at sea. 
 Consider the meaning of Navy as a tool for power 
projection in the hand of a higher system which is the 
State. 
 Consider a system which positions safety of crew 
before the accomplishment of the mission, specifically 
in peacetime. This should be reviewed in wartime. 
 
 
5.3 Research Contribution to Knowledge 
This research tested systems thinking in an exploratory study of warship, CG and 
commercial ship safety. It has highlighted the value of the approach by 
demonstrating the link between subsystem-ship functioning and safety with the 
control mechanism in shipping/CG/navy systems. It has provided some areas of 
investigation to enhance safety in relation to warship operations. 
 
5.4 Recommendation from Research 
Further research is required to validate the findings and examine in-depth the 
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Glossary of Terms 
Achieved Finality means the purpose or goal(s) actually attained by a system through behaviour. 
Allocated (stated) Finality means the purpose or goal which a system is supposed to achieve 
through behaviour. A system may not achieve its allocated finality and could even achieve a 
counterfinality (negating purpose). 
Captain is the generic name for a leader of any size of ship. In this work, Captain means the 
commander of a warship or CG ship who is of a senior rank in the military/CG. 
Coast Guard Cutter is a Coast Guard vessel 65 feet in length or greater, having accommodation 
for a crew. 
Commanding Officer (CO) is a military officer in command of a military vessel or shore 
establishment. 
Commercial Shipping means the act or means of transporting goods by sea for a fee. Usually a 
business entity driven by profit and uses ships as its main tool. 
Corvette is usually a small, manoeuvrable and lightly armed warship. It is differentiated by size 
or displacement; usually between 55-100 m long or 550- 2790 tons22. It is smaller than the average 
Frigate but bigger than coastal crafts and missile boats. However, some modern Corvettes may be 
similar in size to a Frigate. 
Coxswain is a person or senior non-commissioned officer in-charge of a ship’s boat and crew 
which are under the Command of an officer and particularly responsible for steering the boat or 
even a ship. This title is popularly used on warships. 
Destroyer means a heavily armed, fast, manoeuvrable warship with long-endurance which escorts 
larger lesser armed warships or convoys to protect them against attack from other warships. 
Destroyers are the main surface combatant warships. They have multi-sensors and have anti-
submarine capability. They may be about 120-160 m long or about 9000 tons. 
Divisional System is the system of organising the crew or company of warships into smaller 
groups often based on trade or mess deck. On warships it is usually commanded by a junior officer 
with the aim of improving discipline, welfare and running of the ship’s routine. It is also a 
leadership, communication and systems for command and control and for addressing personnel 
grievances. 
                                                        
22 https://www.wrightys-warships.com/corvette.html 
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Executive Officer (XO) is the Second in-Command of a warship who aids, deputises and reports 
directly to the Commanding Officer or Captain. He is responsible for the daily, efficient and safe 
running of the ship. He is usually a navigator or a deck officer. 
Feedback Loop is a closed chain of causal connections from a stock, through a set of decisions or 
rules or physical laws or actions that are dependent on the level of the stock, and back again 
through a flow to change the stock. 
Flag Officer Fleet is usually a senior naval officer of the rank or Commodore or Rear Admiral, 
who is in Command of a group of warships assigned to him. The CO/Captains of these ships report 
directly to him. He is responsible for the operational deployment, maintenance, safety and security 
of the ships as well as the discipline and welfare of the crew. 
Flows are the mechanism of operation in systems, which drive interactions through 
interconnections. They bind systems and enable communication.  
Frigate is a warship highly specialised in anti-air warfare though it may have anti-submarine 
capability. It is similar to but lager than a corvette and smaller than a Destroyer. Frigate design, 
role and size vary widely. 
Group Think a way of thinking which leads to self-deception of safety, involuntary consenting 
to group decision and conforming to the values and ethics of a group. 
Hierarchy is the arrangement of aggregation of subsystems to form systems. Subsystems also 
have internal hierarchies, which enables them to regulate, maintain and take care of themselves.  
Larger systems coordinate and enhance the functioning of the subsystems as stable, resilient and 
efficient structures. Meanwhile, subsystems serve the needs of the larger systems. Hierarchical 
systems evolve from bottom up. The purpose of the upper layers of the hierarchy is to serve the 
purposes of the lower layers. 
Inertia is the apparent delay, buffer or shock absorbers in systems reaction to inputs, influences 
or changes in interactions. 
Maritime Operations are activities and actions conducted with the aim of achieving the purposes 
of Warships, Coast Guard and Commercial ships. The term used in this work mainly covers 
Warship, Coast Guard and Commercial ship operations. Maritime operations include; combat 
operations, navigation, security operations, safety inspections and operations, transport of cargo 
and search and rescue. 
Master is a senior ranking mariner who has overall command of ship. The ultimate responsibility 
for the safety, efficiency, seaworthiness, cargo operation and compliance with regulations lies with 
the Master. 
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Ministry of Defence (MoD) is the government agency responsible for maintaining an active and 
effective Armed Force for the Defence of a State. MoD formulates national defence and security 
strategies, issues policies and provides resources for the attainment of strategic goals. 
Naval Headquarters (NHQ) the highest command, control and administrative establishment in a 
Navy. It is responsible for the modelling of naval operations, safety, maintenance, deployment and 
manning of ships. 
Operations are acts, processes or ways of operating or group of activities conducted to achieve an 
aim. 
Petty Officer is a naval rank for a non-commissioned officer superior to seamen (ordinary, able, 
leading) but junior to Chief Petty Officers. They are usually heads of Departments under the 
Divisional System and supervise men junior to them in rank. 
Redundancy is the addition of extra components and channels of information to the critical ones 
in use in order to enhance the reliability and damage survivability of a system. 
Resilience is the ability to bounce or spring back into shape or position after being pressed or 
stretched. It is measure of a system’s ability to survive and persist or recover from perturbation 
within a variable environment.  
Safety I means the ability of a system to function successfully under differing conditions, by 
reducing the number of harmful outcomes (accidents / incidents / near misses) to as low as 
possible. Safety-I is achieved by making sure that things do not go wrong, either by reducing the 
causes of malfunctions and hazards, or mitigating effects. 
Safety II means the ability of a system to function successfully under differing conditions, by 
raising the number of purposed outcomes to as high as possible. Safety-II is achieved by making 
as many things as possible go right, rather than by preventing them from going wrong. 
Self-organization is the capacity of systems to structure themselves, to create new structures, to 
learn, diversify, and complexify. 
Shipping is used with the same meaning as commercial shipping. 
Stock is the memory of the history of changing flows within the system. 
System are collections of elements or parts of a whole coherently organized with patterns of 
interconnection or structure that produces a characteristic set of behaviour, usually classified as its 
function or purpose or finality. Systems behaviour could be adaptiveness, goal-seeking, resilience, 
self-organisation or evolutionary behaviour. Key concepts in systems are flow, stock, delay, 
feedback and wholeness. The Systems described in this research are System-Navy, System-CG 
and System-Shipping which represent Navy, CG and Shipping as systems. 
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Subsystems are the components of systems or the elements that make up system. The behaviour 
and functions of these subsystems contribute to overall systems behaviour and function. 
Interactions between subsystems also produce emergent properties that are different from mere 
summations of these subsystems. Subsystems are also made up of elements which function in a 
systemic view. Subsystem-ships discussed in this work are Subsystem-Warship, Subsystem- CG 
ship and Subsystem- commercial ship as part of their respective Navy, CG and Shipping Systems. 
Submarine is a unique type of warship capable of submerging and conducting combat operations 
underwater for long periods (about 3 months or more). It usually attacks surface ships with 
torpedoes of attack other submarines. Few submarines are capable of firing missiles (Nuclear). 
Thick description means describing the thinking, planning and intentionality behind the research work 
in its context of the maritime world. Thick description seeks to show the social relations, motivations 
and emotions of researchers and participants in a research but not just a mere accumulation of details of 
research data. A researcher employing Thick description is required to describe and interpret observed 
social behaviours and actions within the specific research context. 
Watchbill is a table containing a list of officers and crew of a ship, their work stations and special 
duties.  
Wholeness an entity containing all parts (without any component) and made up of interrelated 




















TRANSCRIPTION OF FOCUS GROUP WITH COMMENTS 
PART 1 – OWNERSHIP AND MISSION (High Level Control System and Finality) 
OWNER 
WARSHIP COAST GUARD SHIP COMMERCIAL SHIP 
1. State (2). 
2. Ministry of Defense (2). 
3. Government (2). 
4. Naval support by third party 
country (1). 
1. State (2). 
2. Ministry of Interior (2). 
3. Ministry of Defense (2). 
4. Government (2). 
5. Alternative ownership to 
complete specific 
missions (SAR, oil spill, 
etc.) 
6. NGO/Mutualship – 
ownership of specific 
missions, ie, Swedish Sea 
Rescue Society in Search 
and Rescue services. 
1. Privately owned company 
by an individual or 
shareholders (3). 
Difference between these 
types of systems occurs 
during decision making. 
2. State owned or supported 
(2). It could be privately 
operated and based on 


















1. War (2). 
2. Projection of national power and 
interests abroad and international 
waters (2). 
3. Combatting and other types of 
military operations (1). 
4. Defence against military action 
from other states. 
5. Protection of national waters 
against external aggression even 
in peril. 
6. Offensive Operations. 
a. Conduct long range operations 
(Poise). 
b. Secondary missions; counter 
piracy, disaster relief, peace 
enforcement operations. 
7. Sea blockade 
8. Commercial ship Escort 
operations. 
POLICE RESPONSE 
1. Law enforcement (3). 
2. Search and Rescue (could 
be shared among all 3 
classifications) (3). 
3. Pollution prevention 
/response (2). 
4. Escort duties/ operations 
(2). 
5. Maritime Regulatory 
functions 
6. Emergency Response. 
7. Defense of Territory 
(National waters). 
PROFIT 
1. Profit and trade (3). 
2. Transportation of goods 
(3). 
3. Survive as a business 
venture. 
4. Research / survey. 
5. Services (Hospital, etc). 
 
Description and Comments 
Ownership and control as reported by participants 
Governments or states are the usual owners of Warship and Coast Guard ships. Specifically, 
Ministries of Defence are the main government organizations which own warships. Coast Guard 
ships may be under the ownership of the Ministry of Interior or Defence.   
Commercial ships are mostly privately owned companies by individuals or shareholders. 
Commercial ships may also be state owned. A privately owned company may be owned by 
individuals or other entities (integrate in groups). 
In some case there is a distinction between ownership and control in Navy, CG and Commercial 
shipping as some function may be outsourced. In this respect, state may subcontract the some 
functions of the Navy to another country through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU); 
especially when it has no capability to own a Navy (A protectorate, colony or failed state). Equally, 
some Coast Guard missions may be subcontracted. This is the concept in which Search and Rescue 
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(SAR) functions are performed by the Swedish Sea Rescue Society and similar organizations in 
other countries (e.g. Germany, UK, France, etc.). Finally, cargo ships can be owned by one 
company (e.g. a bank) but effectively controlled and operated by a nexus of other companies 
(shipmanagers, operators, charterers, etc.).  
 
Mission of ships according to participants 
As State owned systems, navy and CG vessels are primarily engaged in State protection missions. 
Navy protects State from external aggression and CG protects State from internal or coastal risks.  
The main mission of warships is maritime warfare operations to protect the national waters against 
external aggressors. It also involves offensive operations as part of projecting a nations power 
oversees into international and hostile territory. A full suite of military operations (military 
response) originate from this overarching mission such as counter piracy, counter terrorism, anti-
narcotics trade, sea blockade and commercial ship escort operations. The military in peace time 
may perform missions requiring it to provide assistance to civil authority such as Search and 
Rescue, peace support operations and disaster relief missions. Missions of warships imply behind 
exposed eventually to two categories of risks. The first category relates to marine environment 
(weather, piracy, etc.) and a second category of risks relates to combat operations and their 
implication in conducting the vessel. Though warships are be prepared for these missions. 
Coast Guard ships engage in missions in maritime domain which are typical police response 
operations. The main missions involve maritime law enforcement and emergency response 
operations. These include border control, traffic alleviation, SAR, pollution prevention and 
response, disaster relief and defence of national territories/waters. Coast Guard missions may also 
be in support of military missions. 
On another hand, commercial ships exist, historically, to generate profit to their owners by 
transporting good by sea. Commercial ships may be involved in survey, research, hospital or 
medical services and migrant rescue. The case of State owned company may be different. 
Originally, they were created to support national trade and independence. Profit-making was 
essential but secondary. This mission of making profit may be the element causing shipping 
























Crew as a whole: 
1. Large sized crew (3). 
2. Same nationality (3). 
3. Bureaucracy and hierarchy 
(2). 
4. Strict compliance with chain 
of command (2). 
5. Specialization. 
6. Combat constraints Special 
teams for specific emergency 
response.  
7. Crew as a whole has a Safety 
First mantra. 
Crew as a whole: 
1. Medium sized crew 
(3). 
2. Same nationality (3). 
3. Crew is specifically 
trained for emergency 
response and highly 
specialized jobs. This 
training could be 
national or 
multinational (3). 
4. As a whole is 
organized in a vertical 
hierarchy. 
 
1. Crew as a whole is 
multinational (2).  
2. Crew as a whole is 
rarely of only one 
nationality.  
3. General training in 
most areas and less 
specialized 
training. 
4. Small size crew. 
5. Flexible career 
patterns mainly 
based on voyage 
contracts. 
6. Multi-tasking of 
crew. 
7. Less division in 
task execution. 
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Crew as individual: 
1. Loyalty (Influenced by salary, 
patriotism) (2). 
2. Specialized training (2). 
3. Minimum training in other 
fields. 
4. Social stability. 
5. Special disciplinary codes. 
6. May be defended by military 
in liability cases. Crew as 
individuals face high levels of 
fatigue; but is seen to be 
normal in military service. 
7. Regulated career pattern with 
minimum sea service. 
8. Contract with Government. 
9. Specialized tasks for crew.  
10. High divisions in task 
execution. 
Crew as individuals: 
1. Loyalty; salary and 
job satisfaction (2). 
2. Specialized training 
and tasking of crew. 
3. Broader 
responsibilities in 
ship operations due to 
wider scope of 
operations. 




5. May be civilian or 
military. 
6. May be defended by 
authorities in liability 
cases. 
7. As individuals are 
employed in Public 
service.  
8. Regulated career 
pattern with minimum 
sea service. 
9. Contract with 
Government. 
1. Crew as 
individuals is 
trained according 
to STCW.  
2. Loyalty driven by 
social conditions 
of employment.  
3. More likely to 





5. Effective in multi-
tasking. 
6. Legal liability. 
 
Description and Comments on Crew/ Crewing 
Shipping as a socio-technical system, currently requires people to operate it. A critical aspect of 
this system is the crew borne on ships. Crewing of ships is determined by the Controller/Owner 
who manages the crew and determines recruitment standards, training, organization, career 
progression, promotion and other terms of employment contract. Issues with crew could be 
discussed in the view of crew as individuals and crew as a whole.   
Crew are usually selected and recruited as individuals, who have basic training. This training is 
supplemented by Shipping Company, Naval and Coast Guard training to build the level of 
capability required of crew of to operate the relevant ships.  Distinctively, Naval and Coast Guard 
crew have same nationality and trained based on national or multinational standards. This is similar 
to the practice on PNTL ships. Commercial ships have multinational crew whose training is based 
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on International Maritime Organisation (IMO) standards (STCW). Onboard training is conducted 
for the crew after joining the ships. Warships, Coast Guard and Commercial ships train and operate 
at an acceptably safe level. Commercial ships use Safety Management Systems while Warship and 
Coast Guard ships follow Standard Operating Procedures. Though Navy and Coast Guards have 
policies and SOPs on individual crew training, the differences between that training and STCW 
training may have contributed to the trend of warship/commercial ships accidents. This ideology 
is supported by the US Navy’s policy to train its sailors according to the STCW standards (US 
Navy, 2017a; LaGrone, 2018 June 29). Training of crew develops the capability of crew members 
but this occurs overtime. Time considerations should be factored in the training of individual crew 
members. Premature deployment of crew, without sufficient time to build experience, could be 
result in human-error caused accidents.   
At the center of the discussion on safety of ships, are issues of manning levels which are key 
determinant of human element issues mainly fatigue. Basically, higher manning levels or larger 
crews creates lesser concerns with fatigue while smaller crews cause more issues of fatigue due to 
more work load (Rothblum, et al, 2000). Commercial ships have relatively smaller crew sizes due 
to the desire to cut cost involved in paying seafarer salaries and allowances causing fatigue. Fatigue 
is known to have caused some major ship accidents (Exxon Valdez, Royal Majesty, Star Princess, 
Jambo and Eagle Otome) negative unintended effect of high cases of fatigue among seafarers 
resulting in accidents and a greater loss of revenue for ship owners (Smith et al., 2003; Strauch, 
2015). Reduction in crew size leading to increased workload and seafarer fatigue was an identified 
cause of the Exxon Valdez grounding (Exarchopoulos et al., 2018). Contrarily, Warships and Coast 
Guard ships have larger crew sizes due to the need for redundancy in operations and high 
specialization in crew tasks. This larger crew sizes should normally translate to lesser cases of 
fatigue. However, due to poor crew management practices, excesses in simulation of training 
scenarios and poor safety management systems, Warship and Coast Guard crew also suffer cases 
of fatigue and accidents. Additionally, military and police establishments maintain a culture of 
performing under extreme states of tiredness and fatigue which encourages causes fatigue to exist 
in these organizations. Optimal manning levels with effective safety management systems are ideal 
in ensuring ship safety as practiced by PNTL ships. PNTL ships have two crews (sailing and stand-







PART 3 –  DESIGN OF SHIP (TECHNICAL SYSTEM) 
DESIGN 
OF SHIP 
WARSHIP COAST GUARD SHIP  COMMERCIAL SHIP 
1. Strengthened hull and 
structures (3). 
2. Heavy weapons, 
sophisticated weapon 
systems and large 
ammunition storage (3). 
3. High speed 
maneuverability (3). 
4. Camouflage (grey) 
colour / stealth shaped 




more subdivisions (2). 
6. High redundancy. 
Multiple Command and 
Control Stations. Engine 
room redundancy with 
multiple high power 
engines (Diesel, gas, 
nuclear, which can be 
combined for higher 
speeds) (3).  
7. Water and air tight 
compartment. 
8. Large accommodation. 
9. Many different sizes and 
designs. No 
international regulation 
on design standards. 
Nationally designed and 
built. 
10. Large fuel capacity 
efficient for military 
missions. 
11. Full type + combine. 
1. High speed (3). 
2. Mission purpose-built (2). 
3. Special capabilities. 
4. Heavy weather characteristics. 
5. Mostly diesel engines. 
6. Designed for medium ranged 
coastal operations. 
7. Ice breakers.  
8. For rescue operations. 
9. Smaller in size. 
10. Mostly of white colour. 
11. Smaller weapons. 
12. Comply with national 
regulations.  
13. Shallow drafted ships. 
14. Diverse size and design of ship 
(specialized vessels for 
firefighting, oil pollution 
response, etc). 
15. Lighter weapons. 
16. Highly hydrodynamic hull. 
17. Communication and detection 
systems 
1. Maximized cargo space. 
Volume is quantified as 
profit so space is 
optimized for profit (3). 
2. Regulated tonnage 
(GT), light and loaded 
displacement (2). 
3. Designed for longer 
distance 
(intercontinental trade). 
4. Large and complex 
engine rooms. 
5. Cost efficient.  
6. Complies with 
international 
regulations. 
7. Optimization of profit. 
8. Classification society 
compliant. 
9. Regulated living and 
working spaces 
(accommodation). 
10. Constrained by 
international regulations 
(highly regulated ie, 
SOLAS). 
11. Ship-port interface (ie; 
ramps, cranes, etc). 
12. Deeper drafted/ bigger 
sized. 
13. Focus on energy 
efficient ships / low 
pollution ships. 
14. Regulated redundancy 





12. Reliable (Performance 
in damaged state). 
13. Reduced complexity. 
14. Complies with national 
regulations.  
15. Highly hydrodynamic 
with block coefficient of 
about 0.6. 
16. Long range detection 
capacity 
(surface/subsurface). 
17. Supply capacity. 
18. Medical/ Infirmary 
capacity. 
19. Specialized firefighting 
system. 
20. Communication / 
detection capacity 
(advanced). 
21. Low noise / vibration 
design (subs). 
22. Diesel oil/ nuclear 
propelled. 
16. Runs on Heavy Fuel Oil; 
requiring auxiliary 
equipment to use in 
propulsion. 
17. Specialized vessels. 
18. Design influenced by 
gigantism, making use 
of economies of scale. 
 
Description and Comments on ship design 
Warships Design 
Warship are mostly designed with high redundancy, high survivability in damaged conditions, 
sustained performance in extreme conditions, heavy weapons, sophisticated weapon systems and 
large ammunition storage capacity. These ships are also noted for high speed manoeuvrability, 
high compartmentalization, hydrodynamic, camouflaged colour and stealth design, and high 
redundancy in systems and design. Basically, warships are designed for war; making heavy 
weapons and high compartmentalization critical aspects of the ship. The design of warships is 
constrained by regulations which are mostly national and ship specific in nature. Other constraints 
include available technology on the market, traditions and conventions in warship design. The 
decision to settle on a specific warship design is taken through a process of trade-offs amongst 
desirable elements. Trade-offs affecting the safety of ships are of utmost concern.  
Warship are designed and built with high redundancy to enable them function in cases of combat 
damage to one of the systems and to enable supplemented performance during high risk operations. 
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Having an operations room supplementing the functions of a navigational bridge serves as support 
and safety check on ship operations. A warship could have a combination of diesel, electric of gas 
turbines which enable it to attain higher speeds during critical periods. However, redundancy in 
systems puts demands on resources which might be limited. Multiple engine types in one ship may 
result in extra cost and sacrificing of spaces which could be used for crew accommodation. 
Therefore, the need for safety causes a trade-off between crew accommodation and amenities and 
desire for redundancy. 
 
Coast Guard Ship Design 
Design and construction of coast guard ship depends highly on its use. A Coast Guard cutter 
resembles a commercial ship design while a fast rescue or patrol vessel may resemble a warship. 
Decisions on trade-off in design and construction of coast guard ships are constrained by national 
regulations and technology. Coast Guard ships are diverse and usually specialized in designs such 
as icebreakers or shallow-drafted vessels and even vessels with heavy weather characteristics.  
 
Commercial Ship Design 
Commercial ships design has been drastically affected by gigantism, economies of scale and 
technology with the overarching aim of making profits. Generally, commercial ships are more 
box-shaped, deep drafted, have cargo handling equipment, maximized cargo carrying capacity, 
aesthetically designed and fitted with environmentally friendly equipment. Though, commercial 
ship design has been focused on energy efficiency and reducing environmental pollution, these 
ships have long used heavy fuel oil which causes pollution. Additionally, commercial ships are 
known to have high block co-efficient (0.84 for a 172000 Bulk Carrier) which makes them 
relatively less hydrodynamic and energy efficient (Choi et al, 2010). Regardless of the design 
concept, commercial ship design is strictly regulated internationally. Commercial ships vary in 
design and operation depending on the aspect of maritime trade they are built for. Decision on 















WARSHIP COAST GUARD 
SHIP 
COMMERCIAL SHIP 
1. Training, exercises 
and drills (2). 
2. Coastal functions/ 
littoral operations. 
3. Supply operations. 
4. Escort mercantile 
ships. 
5. Preparing for war. 






1. SAR (2). 
2. Law enforcement 
and crime 
interdiction (2). 
3. Oil spill response. 




7. Survey and 
research 
operations. 
8. Construction and 
servicing of aids to 
navigation. 
1. Transport of cargo (2). 
2. Bunkering operations. 
3. Assistance to ships and 
persons in distress if 
encountered. 
4. Energy efficient operation; 
just-in time arrivals, slow 
steaming, trim optimization 
and weather optimized 
routes. 
5. Shipping operations; as link 
in world trade. 
6. Clinical services. 
7. Dredging operations. 
8. Salvage operations. 
9. Offshore drilling and 
support operations. 
 
Description and Comment 
Warships mainly conduct combat operations in defence of territorial waters or offensive action to 
project national interest in international waters or overseas territories. Other operations include 
support of commercial ships; as escorts through high threat (piracy prone) waters, keeping sea 
lanes of communication open and patrols to ensure the general protection of ships in national 
waters. Emergency response, crime interdiction operation and sea evacuation of stranded persons 
are also included in the array of naval operations. Though most warships conduct frequent and 
nearly continues training for combat operations, real-life combat operations do not occur often. 
This translates to Navies spending lots of time training for combat missions rather than actually 








PART 5 – EMERGENT DISCUSSIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF SHIP SAFETY 
FATIGUE 
Warship Coast Guard Ship Commercial 
Ship 
1. Not internationally 
regulated but managed 
with customary 4 hours 
shift system (watch 
system). 
2. HQ policy and 
instructions guide 
fatigue regulation. 
3. Owner regulated. 
Not internationally 
regulated but managed 
by customary 4 hours 




1. Political (Not partisan 
politics but you need to 
be seen as hardworking 
and effective). 
2. Impressive career 
performance. 
3. Years of service not 
necessarily a specified 
sea time. 
4. Promotion examination. 
5. Not fully dependent on 
sea time. 
6. Based on superior’s 
assessment. 
7. Trust in-confidence of 
President/Cabinet/Minis
ter. 
8. Regardless, a more 
defined promotion 
process. 
1. Political (Commission 
on appointment). 
2. Need to have a good 
network. 
3. Same as that in the 
Navy. 
1. Time at sea. 








4. Promoted based 
on necessity. 
5. Could be 
promoted at sea 
in different 
capacities. 




1. Satisfies operational 
requirements or mission 
(training for war and 
patrolling). 




1. More time at 
sea. 
2. Motivated by 
trade/profit. 
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2. Estimate for developing 
countries – 2 months at 
sea/year. 
3. Estimate for developing 
countries – 4 to 6 
months. 
4. Sea time causes direct 
loss of money to state. 
5. Sea time constrained by 
resources. 
NB. Nuclear submarines 
spend 4 months at sea/ 
year. 
2. Estimate for 
developed countries – 
4 to 6 months. 
3. Sail on demand 
(SAR) and may cause 
direct loss of money. 
4. Resource constrained. 
3. Nearly at sea 
everyday (10-
11 months). 
4. Gains money 
while at sea. 
 
Description and Comments 
Though not considered as key part of the discussion, certain important topics which concerned 
safety emerged. The topics were spontaneously volunteered by respondents who though such 
topics were crucial aspects of ship safety and could unveil answers to questions posed by this 
research. Safety is an emergent property of shipping systems and can only be described and 
analysed in context of a whole (Leveson, 2011). Focusing on one property or aspect of shipping 
and during accident investigation or safety analysis may be ineffective if not counter-productive 
in improving safety. Therefore, after considering all the facets of shipping (owner, mission, design, 
crewing and conduct of shipping operation) as a whole in the shipping context it is necessary to 
discuss some emerging themes.  
 
It should also be noted that Navy, Coast Guard and Commercial Shipping systems have their 
peculiarities and specificities which may make an otherwise good solution in one system 
ineffective in the other. The specific context should be considered when discussing and addressing 
emergent safety issues. The emerging discussions covered are sea time, promotions and fatigue. 
 
A critical look at safety in systems theory reveals certain instrumental ideas which aid further 
understanding. In this concept, accidents are seen as the result of interactions within 
components/subsystems, interactions between components/subsystems and interaction between 
components and their environment. Additionally, an understanding of operation process and 
functions of feedback loops gives a full understanding of causes of accidents. Inappropriate 
imposition of constraints is the common cause of all these accidents. Accident events are the 
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symptom of inadequate constraints and control. This further supports the concept of safety being 
an emergent property of systems.  
 
Fatigue  
The discussion concerning fatigue was intricate with varying opinions some of which turned to be 
too passionate for academic purposes. Unanimously, fatigue was agreed to be a major cause of 
ship accidents and a result of some unscrupulous shipping companies exploiting seafarers. Some 
seafarers present during the discussion, indicated that their high levels of fatigue on ships drove 
them to stop sailing and pursue administrative jobs; a reason for pursuing MSc in WMU. 
Regardless, fatigue is widely known to be a cause of accidents. Fatigue is known to have been a 
major human factor cause of the Exxon Valdes disaster (MSC.1/Circ.1598, 2019). The Marine 
Accidents Investigation Branch (MAIB) in 2004 studied 66 accident investigation reports and 
concluded that ship Masters’ inability to discharge their responsibilities, low watchkeeper manning 
levels and fatigue were major causes of ship grounding and collisions (Akhtar & Utne, 2015).  
 
Promotions 
Promotion is an essential tool in motivating and ensuring career progression of seafarers. It has an 
added advantage of enabling the organization internally develop capability of seafarers and employ 
them in positions with more responsibilities. Usually, seafarers have an understanding of 
requirements for promotion at employment (usually stated in contract).  Since, employees 
(seafarers) are required to satisfy certain requirements (professional capability and performance of 
duty); they tend to increase their performance in order to earn promotion at the earliest. The desire 
of seafarers to increase their performance and be professional is constructive and helps the 
organization attain its mission. However, an uncontrolled desire to impress authorities may lead 
to extreme or wrong practices which may be detrimental to the sustenance of the company. 
 
Sea time 
Discussions revealed Warships and Coast Guard ships spent lesser periods at sea as compared to 
commercial ships. Warships are deemed to be underway from 2 to 4 months per year at the least. 
A seafarer serving on such a ship for 5 years would have accumulated between 10 to 20 months at 
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TRANSCRIPTION OF INTERVIEW WITH CAPTAIN SIMON CHAPLIN ON 24 APRIL 
2019 
 
Pacific Nuclear Transport Limited (Model of High-Level Safety) 
Serial Question Answer (Discussion) 
1. Owners. 









Are there any other 
interest  




Pacific Nuclear Transport Limited (PNTL) is owned by 
International Nuclear Services (68.75%), ORANO (12.5%) 
and Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC); a 
consortium of Japanese nuclear companies (18.75%). It 
operates as a subsidiary company of International Nuclear 
Services and its fleet is managed by Serco Limited. This 
network of owners was due to the need to transport Nuclear 
fuels (nuclear fuel and used nuclear fuel) between Japan and 
Europe.  
 
PNTL is a member of the World Nuclear Transport Institute 
which has 47 other members, as shown in Figure 1 (WNTI, 
2019a). These institutions are interested in the ownership and 
regulation of nuclear transport ships worldwide due to the 
reputation damage an accident on one nuclear transport ship 
could cause to other ships and the entire nuclear fuel cycle. This 
is the motivation for operating high safety standards in order to 
maintain the reputation of the nuclear clear. Sufficient 
resources are made available for the design and construction of 
the ships. 
2. Mission. 
What is the mission of 





The primary purpose of PNTL ships (Organisation) is to 
provide transport services and not to make money, though I am 
not in a position to determine if the company is making profit 





The ships serve as a critical link in the fuel cycle by providing 
transportation of back end materials in the nuclear fuel cycle. 
Specifically, they carry spent fuel, Mixed Oxides fuel 
assemblies and vitrified high level waste mainly between Japan 
and Europe. The International Maritime Organisation’s (Code) 
for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and 
High Level Wastes in Flasks On Board Ships (INF Code) 
regulate these back end materials (PNTL, 2019). These waste 
materials are removed from power stations for long term 
storage or recovered for re-use. About 96% of the initial energy 
in nuclear fuel is re-used (WNTI, 2019b). These Nuclear power 
stations provide 16% of the world's electricity (WNTI, 2019c). 
A total of 20 million consignments of radioactive materials are 
transported around the world yearly (WNA, 2019).  
3. Design of ship. 
a. What are the key 

























Importantly, INF ships are classified into three categories: 
a. INF 1 is the lowest level and carries radioactive fuel of INF 
material up to 4000 
terra-becquerel of activity. It could be a cross channel ferry. 
b. INF 2 is restricted to 2 x 106 terra Becquerel and has more 
stringent regulations on 
the level of radioactivity. INF 2 could be a regular commercial 
ship that could carry other cargoes. 
c. INF 3 has no limit on the level of radioactivity involved. INF 
3 ships are ships, specifically made to carry radioactive 
material. 
 
PNTL ships are constructed and operated according to 
international regulations. They comply with regulations such 
as SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW, MLC, Nuclear regulations 
(Orange Book- United Nations Committee of Experts for all 
Dangerous goods by all modes of transport, IMDG Code (Class 
7) by IMO, SSR6 by IAEA, Nuclear Security (Convention on 
physical protection of nuclear materials). SSR6 is, however, 
the reference for clarifying any doubts arising from differences 
in the use of terminology. The possible interference of 
regulations on each other (i.e., safety and security) is taken into 











































Though no accidents have occurred (Zero-accident record), the 
ship will be able to withstand collisions due to its high standard 
of design. The first generation of INF ships had the highest 
safety standards ever, though there were no regulations by then. 
However, these high safety standards are resource-dependent. 
INS sought the highest construction standard to ensure safety 
due to the need to gain and retain the public perception of safety 
of the ships and the entire Nuclear energy system. Currently, 
these safety standards are above and beyond regulation 
standards. 
 
In hull construction, the ships have collision bulkheads which 
are similar to that of average cargo ship though with some 
reinforcement. Extra reinforcement is placed on hatch covers 
to provide radiological protection. The ships have extra plating 
and high subdivisions with four holds and double hull 
construction to give collision protection.  
 
Notably, PNTL ships have reserve buoyancy in 4 hatches, 
enabling it to float in a fully flooded condition. This is an 
essential factor since water is the best treatment for radioactive 
leakage meaning holds could be flooded in case of radioactive 
leakage without affecting the buoyancy of the vessel. The ship 
has sufficient reserve buoyancy for this purpose and has been 
a design feature since the first-generation of vessels. 
 
Another design feature is high redundancy built into most 
systems to enable the ship to operate even after damage. These 
include: 
a. Twin independent engine rooms. 
b. Independent shafting systems and twin rudders.  
c. Dual navigation and communication systems. 
d. Extensive fire detection and fighting systems.  
 
The ship The ships could operate with one engine room while the other 
is shut down for maintenance. These ships also run on low 
sulfur fuel oil.  
Design plan of ships is approved by UK MCA; who visit 











Do PNTL ships conduct 
special-to-type 
(specialized) operations, 
making them different 




b. How different are these 




c. Do the ships have access 








d. Does cargo inhibit the 
conduct of operations? 
PNTL and other nuclear transport ship. Goal-Based Standards 
could be used in regulating the construction of these ships 
meeting INF Code standards. 
Conspicuously, the ships have no deck cranes, which limits the 
capability of attackers in simply assessing cargo. Ships are 
fitted with transponders to enable echolocation in case of a ship 
sinking.  
 
Generally, ships conduct normal operations. Ship conduct 
specialized operations when carrying category one cargo 
(MOX) requiring higher security levels. In territorial waters of 
other states, the security apparatus of the concerned state may 
require special measures; restricting any port entry until PNTL 
vessel enters ports. Highly dependent on security risk analysis 
of the territorial state. 
 





Yes, we have access to repair yards just like any other ship on 
a voyage. Additionally, we do carry some level of spare 
equipment (spare propeller blades) which enables repairs in 
shipyards along our voyage.  
 
Notwithstanding these, the aim of high redundancy (twin 
engines, twin rudders) is to mitigate the effects of damage to 
systems that could cripple the entire operation of the ship. 
 
 
The shipping line has close collaboration with a salvage 
company that would salvage ships or cargo should they sink. 
The cargo does not inhibit operations because the ships are 
designed to enable the conduct of operations without going into 
cargo holds. When necessary to go into a cargo hold cargo, 
packaging and safety procedures enable safe entry and 
operations in holds. Conceptually, the design of the ship 
enables a ship to move cargo safely from one point to the other 
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while the package of the cargo is mainly to ensure the safety 
and integrity of the radioactive material during transport. 
4. Crew as a whole. 
a. How is the crew 















b. How is the crew trained 









c. How does this 
organization of crew, 
enable the response to 
emergencies. 
 
The Captain is in absolute command of the ship. The next 
senior line of appointments involves Heads of Department for 
Deck (Chief Officer), Engine (Chief Engineer) and Catering 
Departments who report to the Captain. In each department, the 
chain of command filters down. 
 
Security personnel are also integrated into crew and Chain-of 
Command. They are led by Chief Inspectors/ Inspectors who 
report directly to the Captain. The team has sergeants who are 
senior to other junior ranking officers. The Captain is on top of 
the overall Command structure and makes final decisions 
based on advice by the head of security team and other 
departments. The Captain does not do watches but takes the 
‘conn’ to conduct high-risk and relatively complicated 
maneouvers and emergencies. 
 
Voyage specific training starts from the Safety Management 
System; which gives safety procedures required as minimum 
standards. Two vessel familiarisation sheets are given to every 
new crew member; one stating basic safety requirements such 
as the location of fire extinguishers and a second list giving 
detail requirement on position-specific functions. An example 
is deck crew knowing how to operate emergency steering. 
Health physics training is also carried out for all crew members 
when a ship is carrying cargo. 
 
General drills are conducted departmentally, and wholly with 
the Captain as the overall authority, every week with more 
specific drills conducted less frequently. Training for all LSA 
and FFA equipment is conducted on a two-month rolling 
schedule. SOPEP drills are also done every six months. The 
ship is provided with a shipboard marine emergency plan 
(SMEP) with flow charts that gives specific functions of the 
crew for initial response to various emergencies. Though not 
comprehensive, it contains step-wise instructions to enable 
clarity of action in urgent situation and prevents the risk of 
missing critical steps in the sequence of responding to incidents 
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(Initiating INF Code and SOPEP report procedures). These are 
part of the ship Safety Management System (SMS). It is 






























b. How are crew members 
recruited for the service 
onboard? 
 
Onboard training is conducted as per company operating 
procedures. Crew obtain statutory training (STCW standards) 
often before joining the company as pertains to other 
commercial ships. UK Nautical Institutes conduct this statutory 
training with certificates from MCA.  
 
Ship specific training is conducted according to the rank and 
department of the crew onboard. Deck officers undergo type-
specific training on navigational equipment onboard, which 
could be done by a UK College conducting shore-based 
equipment training. This training is done during lay-time for 
ships while waiting for cargo. Owners also provide cargo-
specific training.  
 
Serco Marine Services (PNTL vessel management company) 
conducts recruitment of crew in addition to taking care of day-
to-day management of vessels. Serco advertises through their 
websites, manning agencies, and encourages employees to 
recommend new employees. Serco gives bonuses to employees 
who are required to recommend only persons they can 
themselves work with onboard ships. The crew are usually 
British or Irish nationals and who work on permanent 
contracts. Senior officers are even required to have the 
certification and experience of the next senior person. 
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6. Operations of ships at sea. 
a. Which operations do PNTL 





















d. How do your crew maintain 

















Ships usually conduct Coastal and Ocean navigation. Vessel 
security, included armed security, is determined on a voyage 
specific basis in line with the Transport Security Plan. The 
ships operate a heightened security regime whenever they 
transport Category 1 cargo (Mixed Oxide– pellets, plutonium). 
However, for passages without Category I cargo through choke 
points like the Panama Canal, security personnel are embarked 
to protect against unarmed attacks (demonstrators) and gunboat 
escorts are used. Security personnel are usually from the UK 
Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC) and comply with 
International Atomic Energy Agency and the UK’s Nuclear 
Industries Security Regulations 2003. 
Masters usually give security briefs before the voyage aiming 
to ensure adequate measures are enforced and to limit the 
unauthorized sharing of information. 
 
Moreso, Mixed Oxide transport requires two ships to sail in 
tandem which provides mutual protection and serves to 
confuse would-be attacked of which particular ship was 
carrying the cargo in transport. 
 
Sea time is challenging to accrue due to voyages being far-in 
between. Few sailings make it challenging for crew members 
to accumulate sea time to maintain their certificates and also 
conduct training and certification for the next level of training. 
Therefore the company employs certain measures designed to 
give all crew a fair opportunity to accumulate sufficient sea 
time. Crew selection for voyages considers crew with the least 
sea-time. Deck officers and cadets are required to keep a record 
of their sea time. Twice yearly, each ship sails for 10-day 
training (familiarisation) voyages around the UK. This gives 
the opportunity to test all equipment, rectify shortcomings, 
train crew (anchoring practice for each deck vessels acting as 
the Captain, SAR exercises, Manoverboard exercises), and 
enable staff to claim voyage sea time based on the 10-day 
voyage. Additionally, the crew is divided into a standby and 
sailing crew which usually spends up to three months at sea or 





















f. What could negatively 




















insufficient, causing junior officers to leave the company 
despite the benefits of working on these ships. 
 
An alternative and more effective solution to insufficient sea 
time is loaning crew out to other companies with high sailing 
frequencies. This is specific to deck officers since engineers do 
not need sea time. Engineers can keep their knowledge base 
current while the ship is in port. Serco (who operated ferries, 
Royal Navy support vessels) and British Antarctic Survey 
vessels are places where the crew is loaned. However, this 
could lead to the poaching of the crew by other companies. 
Notwithstanding, the crew may be assigned to other jobs aside 
from ship duties. The crew may be assigned to INS as marine 
advisors or to ship the management office. 
 
Our main transport route runs Europe-Japan. Occasionally, we 
operate trans-Atlantic routes (Med to US), Japan to US, 
Australia to UK, UK Coastal waters, and European routes. 
 
Most conditions or causes which could negatively impact the 
operational safety of the vessels have been addressed. 
However, the vessels could become un-operational in the 
situation where the vessels are operated over long periods 
without adequate spare parts (possibly due to the manufacturer 
no longer fully supporting certain equipment). Currently, 
PNTL ships have an average age of 10 years and could last 
another 15 years before being decommissioned. Regardless of 
age, these vessels are managed according to top class safety 
standards. 
 
Ships are usually fully crewed, making it theoretically ready to 
sail at any time. However, issues with bunkering and crew 












involvement in safety. 
a. Is top management involved 














b. What is the reaction of top 
management/ operators to 













c. Do crew participates in the 
development of safety 








Top management is deeply involved in ship safety 
management and continuously reminds the ship crew of safety 
standards. Ships have a safety code requiring the reporting of 
near-misses and similar issues. Serco, as the ship Manager, 
monitors near-miss reports. They monitor the number and 
analyze the causes in order to take appropriate corrective 
actions. Serco expects ship Masters to lead in safety issues and 
keep the momentum on safety issues high. INS is also involved 
in ship safety in order to ascertain ships are reliable for nuclear 
transport without causing accidents, which may result in bad 
publicity for the nuclear transport system. Stakeholders have 
regular safety meetings, held close to the port in order to have 
direct inputs from ship's crew on safety matters.  
 
Owners/ Managers want to know near-miss reporting is done 
correctly and receive feedback from lessons learned in near 
misses. All crew are trained in near-miss reporting. The 
Managers Office collects information, analyses, and circulates 
the information and findings among the ships. Trends are 
generally easy to determine and discuss during safety 
committee meetings. Safety and near misses are thoroughly 
discussed during these meetings, and remedies to trends are 
feedback into the system to enable improvement of safety.  
 
Top management tries to be positive and maintain a no-blame 
culture. This is challenging since there is a need to highlight 
when an individual has erred. Therefore this is better referred 
to as a Just-culture and not blame-culture. 
 
Everyone is encouraged to participate in the development of 
safety culture. This is done subtly and not forced on crew to 
enable willing and effective participation. The Master leads by 
example with the hope of making crew emulate his/her lead.  
 
The Master is allowed a diversion from passage route for safety 










d. Are Masters given enough 





8. Role of Regulators. 
a. What is the role of regulators 





b. What is the implication of a 




b. What happens after an 
accident? 
 
Master to divert course is usually not challenged and seen as 
good safety or administrative practice. 
A proposal for passage is sent to the ship. The crew analyses 
the proposal and plans for passage by checking the readiness 
of the ship. 
 
Yes, enough resources are given to Masters. There are regular 
meetings between the Masters’ and Managers to agree what 
resources should be provided. The Managers must strike a 
balance between what resources are needed for safety 
management and what is requested. 
 
 
There is a pre-sailing safety inspection, testing, and basic 
training in the use of all systems onboard the ship. This 
involves all crew and owner representatives who come to 




Failure of an MCA audits may include invoking of Code 17, 
which will require the ship to be stopped from sailing. They 
could also give a deadline for repairs of corrections to be 
effected in order to enable ships to return to sea.  
 
For UK registered vessels, and accident in the UK, accident 
investigations would be conducted by the Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch (MAIB) for the UK Maritime regulator 
(MCA). Other States may also investigate (such as if the 
accident occurred in their territory). The nature of an 
investigation would also depend on whether the accident 
involved nuclear/radioactive material and if there was a release 






















                                             
 
 
                                              Interview/Focus Group Consent Form 
 
Research topic: Exploratory study on using system thinking to analyse Navy/Coast Guard                                         
/Commercial Shipping safety in ship operation  
 
 
Date of interview/group work: 28 March 2019 
Expected duration:  
Name of participant: 
Name of researcher: Seth Anthony Dzakpasu 
 
 
Dear Ms/Mr.     
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview/focus group, which is carried out in 
connection with a research project which will be conducted by the interviewer, in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Maritime affairs at the World Maritime 
University in Malmo, Sweden. 
This consent form intends to ensure that you understand the purpose of your involvement and that 
you agree to the conditions of your participation. 
 Your interview will be recorded (if you agree) and notes will be taken during the meeting. 
 From the interview, there will be a transcript of main points retained by the researcher. 
 The transcript will be sent to you to provide you with the opportunity to correct any 
factual errors. 
 The transcript will be analyzed by the researcher to support the investigation. 
 The access to the transcript will be limited to researchers and academics involved in the 
research. 
 The information provided will be used for research purposes and will form part of a 
research reports or/and academic papers as well as eventually in presentations.  
 Any extract or quotation of the interview used for publicly available publication will be 
anonymized.  
 
Moreover, you have the right to stop the interview or withdraw from the research at any time, and 
your personal data will be immediately deleted on your request. 
Anonymized research data will be archived on a secure drive linked to a World Maritime 
University email address. All the data will be deleted after completion of the research. 
 
Your participation in the interview is highly appreciated.  
 
Student’s name  Seth Anthony Dzakpasu 
Specialization  Maritime Safety & Environmental Administration 
Email address  w1802820@wmu.se 
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* * * 
Quotation agreement 
 
I consent to my interview, as outlined above, being used for this study. I understand that all 
personal data relating to participants is held and processed in the strictest confidence. 
I also understand that my words may be quoted directly. With regards to being quoted, please 
initial next to any of the statements that you agree with:  
 
I wish to review the notes, transcripts, or other data collected during the research 
pertaining to my participation.  
 I agree to be quoted directly.  
 
I agree to be quoted directly if my name is not published and a made-up name 
(pseudonym) is used.  
 I agree that the researchers may publish documents that contain quotations by me.  
By signing this agreement, I agree that;  
1. I am voluntarily participating in this research project and I can stop the interview at any time;  
2. The transcribed interview or extracts from it may be used as described above;  
3. I have read the Information sheet;  
4. I can request a copy of the transcript of my interview and may make edits; 
5. I am free to ask any questions I wish to researchers and to contact them in the future.  
 






Date:  ……………………………………………………………………… 
 
Contact Information  
This research has been approved under WMU Ethics. For additional questions or concerns, please 
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Student’s name  Seth Anthony Dzakpasu 
Specialization  Maritime Safety & Environmental Administration 
Email address  w1802820@wmu.se 
You can also contact research supervisor 
Supervisor’s name Dr. Raphael Baumler 
Position   Associate Professor 
Email address  rb@wmu.se 
 
 
 
 
 
 
